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KEEPING THE FLIES OUT OF THE
OINTMENT: RESTRICTING OBJECTORS TO
CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENTS
BRUCE D. GREENBERG†
It is not the critic who counts, not the man who points out how
the strong man stumbled, or where the doers of deed could have
done better. The credit belongs to the man who is actually in the
arena: whose face is marred by the dust and sweat and blood;
who strives valiantly; who errs and comes short again and
again . . . who knows the great enthusiasms, the great devotions,
and spends himself in a worthy cause; who, at the best, knows in
the end the triumph of high achievement; and who, at the worst
if he fails, at least fails while daring greatly, so that his place
shall never be with those cold and timid souls who know neither
victory nor defeat.1

INTRODUCTION
Most class actions are resolved by settlement. By rule, class
action settlements must be approved by the court.2 When the
parties to a class action and their respective counsel agree to
settle the case, they join forces in presenting their settlement to
the court and seeking approval of that settlement.
The settlement is agreed to, however, without direct
involvement by members of the class that will be bound by the

†
Bruce D. Greenberg, B.A., University of Pennsylvania, 1979, J.D., Columbia
University School of Law, 1982, is a member of the law firm of Lite DePalma
Greenberg, LLC, Newark, New Jersey. He regularly handles class action matters,
most often on behalf of plaintiffs but sometimes on behalf of defendants. As a matter
of full disclosure, he in one instance represented, successfully, an objector to a class
action settlement. The author thanks his partners Allyn Z. Lite and Katrina Carroll,
and his former colleague, Vermont Law School Lawyer Librarian Julie Graves
Krishnaswami, for their input and insights on the subject of this Article.
1
Shaw v. Toshiba Am. Info. Sys., Inc., 91 F. Supp. 2d 942, 961 (E.D. Tex. 2000)
(quoting Theodore Roosevelt).
2
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e). Many state court class action rules are largely similar in
this and other respects discussed in this Article and will not be separately discussed
or cited. See, e.g., N.J. CT. R. 4:32-2(e)(1)(A) (2010).
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settlement. As a result, such “absent class members” are
permitted to object that a proposed settlement is not fair,
reasonable, and adequate.3
In theory, objectors can occasionally highlight aspects of a
proposed settlement that are unreasonable or that expose
conflicts among the interests of class members or between class
counsel and the class.4 But in reality, all too frequently, objectors
and their counsel see an opportunity to extract money from the
parties or class counsel, whose efforts brought about the
settlement, by threatening to upset or seriously detour the
settlement. Objectors make arguments that are groundless yet
sufficient to delay the settlement approval process for months or
years unless class counsel or the parties agree to “buy off” the
objector or the objector’s counsel. Objector tactics can prove
lucrative because the other parties may prefer to “buy off” the
objectors rather than suffer the delay and additional expense
necessary to defeat the objection.
Courts have been somewhat schizophrenic about objectors.
A few cases have recognized that objectors can sometimes inform
the court of problems with a proposed settlement that the
parties, no longer adversaries, would not perceive or raise.5 Far
more courts, however, have noted that many objections are
groundless and filed for purposes of extracting unwarranted
payments.6 Such objections are most often filed by “professional
objectors”—attorneys who make their living by objecting to class

3
See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(5). The right of absent class members to object to a
settlement is guaranteed by the Due Process Clause. See Phillips Petroleum Co. v.
Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 811–12 (1985). Absent class members in cases certifying
classes under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3) also have the right to exclude
themselves from the settlement. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2)(B)(v) (stating that there is
an absolute right to opt out of settlement where the class is certified in connection
with settlement); id. 23(e)(4) (stating that the court may afford a new opportunity to
opt out if the class was certified prior to settlement). Such exclusion is beyond the
scope of this Article. Sometimes, in multiple defendant cases, nonsettling defendants
object to settlements, often, though not always, based on “bar orders” that limit their
right to shift responsibility to the settling defendant. See, e.g., In re Heritage Bond
Litig., 546 F.3d 667, 676 (9th Cir. 2008). Such objections are also beyond the scope of
this Article.
4
See, e.g., MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH) § 21.643 (2004).
5
See infra note 73 and accompanying text.
6
See infra notes 55–64 and accompanying text.

84 St. John’s L. Rev. 949 (2010)

2010]

KEEPING THE FLIES OUT OF THE OINTMENT

951

action settlements and extracting a part of class counsel’s hardearned attorney fees or a payment from the settling parties for
compromising those objections.7
In at least two ways, professional objectors harm the class
members whose interests they claim to represent.
First,
professional objectors’ almost invariably groundless objections
delay the provision of relief to class members who, in most
instances, have already waited years for resolution. Second, by
feeding off the fees earned by class counsel who took the risk of
suing defendants on a purely contingent basis, as is the normal
practice in class actions, professional objectors create a
disincentive for class counsel to take on such risky matters. That
disincentive clashes with the public interest, repeatedly
recognized by courts, to incentivize class counsel to handle such
cases.
This Article proposes changes in the way courts evaluate
objections and the persons who bring them. It also suggests a
return to fundamental principles of the law governing attorney
fees for objector counsel. Restricting objector counsel fees would
reduce their incentive to file groundless objections, by limiting
fee awards to only those who raise valid problems with a
settlement that the courts would not otherwise perceive.
Reducing the ability of objectors, particularly professional
objectors, to obtain a fee will concomitantly lessen the frequency
of their objections, thus benefiting class members by reducing
delays in the implementation of appropriate settlements.
Part I shows that objectors, especially professional objectors,
are frequently not needed, particularly in the high-dollar cases
where they normally surface, since existing multi-layered
protections ensure the fairness of settlements. The protections
include the class counsel’s fiduciary duty to the class, the class
counsel’s own economic interest in advocating only appropriate
settlements, the obligation of judges to scrutinize settlements for
7

See Edward Brunet, Class Action Objectors: Extortionist Free Riders or
Fairness Guarantors, 2003 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 403, 437 & n.150 (defining “professional
objectors” as “attorneys who make a living free riding off the work of class counsel”
by “filing objections in class action cases, usually after a proposed settlement has
emerged, and always to collect a fee”). Professor Brunet found insufficient evidence
at that time to determine whether professional objectors existed. See id. at 437–39.
As this Article will demonstrate, however, cases since that time show conclusively
the existence of professional objectors and their increasing unjustifiable interference
with major proposed class action settlements.
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fairness and the class counsel’s requested fees for
reasonableness, judges’ track record of carefully evaluating
settlements even before objectors come on the scene, and, in
many cases, the role of governmental agencies who must be
notified of proposed settlements and can protect class members’
interests. Only in the relatively rare case in which an objector
raises a valid problem with a settlement that a court would not
otherwise have perceived does an objection have value, and
professional objectors virtually never do that.
Instead, as Part II shows, professional objectors often fail to
make the effort necessary to understand the settlement that they
are attacking, as courts have frequently noted.
Instead,
professional objectors simply present the same “canned”
objections again and again, often copying them verbatim from
case to case regardless of their appropriateness.
Part II
identifies some of these boilerplate arguments made by objectors
of all types and suggests that courts treat such objections, and
any objections by professional objectors, either as presumptively
invalid or incapable of supporting an objector counsel’s request
for fees.
Finally, Part III reviews the law applicable to objector fee
requests. The general rule has been that objectors can only
rarely win a fee award for objecting, but some courts recently
have been more receptive to fee awards for objector counsel.
Since professional objectors have perceived that it has become
easier to obtain a fee, they have been emboldened to file
objections in any case of significant size. That result disserves
class members by: (1) delaying implementation of settlements;
and (2) disincentivizing class counsel, who end up having to
share their fees with professional objectors who did nothing to
create the value from which the fees result. Courts should return
to the rule that objector fees are only rarely available and then
only where objector counsel substantially benefit the class.
I.

THE CURRENT LANDSCAPE OF THE CLASS ACTION
SETTLEMENT PROCESS

Class actions are risky and complex.8 In recognition of that
fact, courts often state that there is no precise settlement amount
8
See, e.g., In re Mego Fin. Corp. Sec. Litig., 213 F.3d 454, 458 (9th Cir. 2000);
Cotton v. Hinton, 559 F.2d 1326, 1331 (5th Cir. 1977); see also Jones v. Dominion
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that is fair, reasonable, and adequate. Rather, there is normally
a “range of reasonableness,” at any point within which
settlement negotiators might properly agree.9 Yet objections
frequently focus on ways in which a proposed settlement falls
short of an optimal one for the class, without regard to the
plaintiffs’ likelihood of ultimate success at trial or whether the
settlement as agreed is nonetheless within the range of
reasonableness.10 In doing so, objectors allege that a lack of
adversarialness by the representative plaintiffs and their counsel
result in a disservice to the class.
A.

The Structural Protections Afforded to Class Members by the
Settlement Process

When the parties to a class action join hands and present a
proposed settlement to a court, the adversarial process, which is

Res. Servs., Inc., 601 F. Supp. 2d 756, 762 (S.D. W. Va. 2009) (stating that class
counsel “risk defeat at several stages of litigation: class certification, dispositive
motions, and finally, trial”).
9
Courts have long listed “the range of reasonableness of the settlement fund in
light of the best possible recovery” among the factors to be considered in evaluating a
proposed settlement. See, e.g., Girsh v. Jepson, 521 F.2d 153, 157 (3d Cir. 1975)
(citation omitted); City of Detroit v. Grinnell Corp., 495 F.2d 448, 463 (2d Cir. 1974)
(citation omitted). Many cases have recognized that this range can encompass even
settlements for only a few cents on the dollar, sometimes depending on the strength
or weakness of the plaintiffs’ case. See, e.g., Grinnell Corp., 495 F.2d at 455 & n.2
(finding that a settlement of even a few cents on the dollar can be reasonable);
Silberblatt v. Morgan Stanley, 524 F. Supp. 2d 425, 429 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (finding
that a settlement payment of 37.5% of all sums allegedly improperly paid to
defendants was “a very good settlement”); In re Rent-Way Sec. Litig., 305 F. Supp.
2d 491, 510 n.4 (W.D. Pa. 2003) (finding that settlement for between five percent
and twenty-five percent of maximum provable damages was reasonable because in
other cases, settlements for even lower percentages of maximum damages had been
approved).
10
See, e.g., Browning v. Yahoo! Inc., No. C04-01463 HRL, 2007 WL 4105971, at
*8 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 16, 2007) (“The few objections that purport to consider the
viability of Plaintiff’s claim either do so in a conclusory manner, or paint an
unreasonably rosy picture of the prospects of success for this class.”); Snell v. Allianz
Life Ins. Co., No. Civ. 97-2784 RLE, 2000 WL 1336640, at *19 (D. Minn. Sept. 8,
2000); In re Domestic Air Transp. Antitrust Litig., 148 F.R.D. 297, 304 (N.D. Ga.
1993) (“[I]t is unrealistic to expect a recovery that is the equivalent of a victory by
plaintiffs at trial.”); In re Wash. Pub. Power Supply Sys. Sec. Litig., 720 F. Supp.
1379, 1394 (D. Ariz. 1989) (observing that objections were based on the “fallacious”
assumption that “the case assured certain victory for Plaintiffs”). As the Seventh
Circuit has stated, a “settlement will not be rejected solely because it does not
provide a complete victory to the plaintiffs.” Isby v. Bayh, 75 F.3d 1191, 1200 (7th
Cir. 1996).
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often said to yield the most appropriate results,11 is no longer
fully operational.12 That can be true both as to the substantive
terms of the settlement and as to the fees to be paid to class
counsel.13 Despite that, however, there are several significant
structural guarantees that lead the parties and their counsel to
settle only on appropriate terms.
First, class counsel have fiduciary duties that run not only to
the named plaintiffs but to absent class members as well.14 To
comply with those duties, class counsel will not settle a case
except after considering the discovery taken, the applicable facts
and law, and the likelihood of success.15 For this reason, many
cases state that the judgment of experienced class counsel, who
are familiar with the facts and law of the case, is to be given
substantial weight in determining whether to approve a
settlement.16
11

See, e.g., Mackey v. Montrym, 443 U.S. 1, 13 (1979) (“[O]ur legal tradition
regards the adversary process as the best means of ascertaining truth and
minimizing the risk of error . . . .”); In re Kensington Int’l Ltd., 368 F.3d 289, 310 (3d
Cir. 2004) (“The adversary process plays an indispensable role in our system of
justice . . . .”).
12
See, e.g., In re Gen. Motors Corp. Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank Prod. Liab. Litig.,
55 F.3d 768, 789 (3d Cir. 1995).
13
The parties sometimes negotiate a “clear sailing” agreement as to fees, under
which the defendant will pay class counsel attorney fees, as awarded by the court, of
up to a certain amount without objection. Courts have differed in their views of such
agreements, though they in fact pose no problem in the context of an arms-length
negotiation. Compare Weinberger v. Great N. Nekoosa Corp., 925 F.2d 518, 525 (1st
Cir. 1991) (“[T]he inclusion of a clear sailing clause in a fee application should put a
court on its guard . . . .”), with In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. Sales Practices Litig.,
148 F.3d 283, 334–35 (3d Cir. 1998) (finding a clear sailing agreement negotiated
only after agreement was reached on settlement for class was not improper); see also
Waters v. Int’l Precious Metals Corp., 190 F.3d 1291, 1293 n.4 (11th Cir. 1999)
(citing cases on both sides of this issue). The Advisory Committee note to Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 23(h) states that “[t]he agreement by a settling party not to
oppose a fee application up to a certain amount, for example, is worthy of
consideration, but the court remains responsible to determine a reasonable fee.”
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(h) advisory committee’s note.
14
See, e.g., Reynolds v. Beneficial Nat’l Bank, 288 F.3d 277, 280 (7th Cir. 2002);
In re Cendant Corp. Litig., 264 F.3d 201, 231 (3d Cir. 2001).
15
These same factors are among those that guide courts’ analyses of whether a
settlement is fair, reasonable, and adequate. See, e.g., Rodriguez v. West Publ’g
Corp., 563 F.3d 948, 963–67 (9th Cir. 2009); Int’l Union v. Gen. Motors Corp., 497
F.3d 615, 631 (6th Cir. 2007); Isby, 75 F.3d at 1198–99; Girsh v. Jepson, 521 F.2d
153, 156–57 (3d Cir. 1975); City of Detroit v. Grinnell Corp., 495 F.2d 448, 463 (2d
Cir. 1974).
16
See, e.g., Isby, 75 F.3d at 1200; DeHoyos v. Allstate Corp., 240 F.R.D. 269, 292
(W.D. Tex. 2007); Thompson v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 216 F.R.D. 55, 65 (S.D.N.Y.
2003).
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Courts have ample reason to be confident in the judgment of
class counsel. For example, in securities fraud cases, class
counsel are no longer selected by the first plaintiff to file a
lawsuit. Instead, class counsel are proposed by the courtappointed lead plaintiff, who is selected after a rigorous and often
competitive process under the Private Securities Litigation
Reform Act (“PSLRA”), and must be approved by the court.17
Even in nonsecurities matters, the court must appoint class
counsel and ensure the adequacy of those counsel when it
certifies a class.18 Rule 23(g)(1)(A) lists a number of criteria that
the court must follow in making that appointment,19 designed to
screen out unqualified or untrustworthy counsel. These criteria
justify reliance on class counsel when they advocate a settlement.
Additionally, class counsel have a financial incentive to seek
adequate settlements. When considering a class settlement,
particularly in cases where a litigation class has not already been
certified, courts are required to find that all the requirements for
class certification, including adequacy of representation under
Rule 23(a)(4), are satisfied.20 Class counsel who recommend an
inadequate settlement will not be found adequate, and the entire
proposed settlement, as well as class counsel’s own fee, will thus
be jeopardized.21 This gives class counsel a financial incentive,
beyond their fiduciary duty, itself a significant motivator,22 to
offer only appropriate settlements for approval.
17

15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(v) (2006) (stating that lead plaintiff selects class
counsel, but subject to court approval).
18
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(g)(1)(A)–(B).
19
Id. 23(g)(1)(A).
20
See, e.g., In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. Sales Practices Litig., 148 F.3d 283,
307–08 (3d Cir. 1998) (citing Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997)).
21
See, e.g., In re Cmty. Bank of N. Va., 418 F.3d 277, 305–08 (3d Cir. 2005)
(expressing discomfort with adequacy of class counsel and vacating settlement based
on failure to satisfy Rule 23 criteria).
22
A finding in one case that class counsel is inadequate affects that counsel not
only in that matter, but in subsequent cases where that same counsel seeks
appointment as class counsel. Courts will be disinclined to appoint as class counsel
attorneys who have been found inadequate elsewhere. Competitors for appointment
as class counsel in such subsequent cases will be quick to highlight such findings of
inadequacy. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Action Accountability: Reconciling
Exit, Voice, and Loyalty in Representative Litigation, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 370, 397
(2000) (noting “open warfare over which counsel is to be chosen lead counsel”);
Nowak v. Ford Motor Co., 240 F.R.D. 355, 358 n.4, 365–66 (E.D. Mich. 2006)
(competitors for lead counsel position hurled charges of failing to meet deadlines or
to observe court rules, filing “copycat” pleadings, and alleged conflicts of interest); In
re Oracle Sec. Litig., 131 F.R.D. 688, 690 (N.D. Cal. 1990) (describing “volleys of
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Second, as a backstop to class counsel, the judge who reviews
a proposed settlement is charged with acting as a fiduciary who
must protect the rights of absent class members.23 Many cases
hold that judges are not simply to rubber-stamp settlements but
are instead to review them scrupulously.24
There is a two-step process for evaluating settlements. First,
the judge determines whether a proposed settlement is sufficient
enough to justify notice to the class and full consideration of the
settlement at a final hearing.25 Though this preliminary review
is deferential,26 and occurs before class members are even made
aware of the proposed settlement so that no objectors are yet
present, judges have rejected a number of proposed settlements
at that stage.27 Second, at the final hearing, the judge considers
disparagement” launched by counsel competing for lead role). This cascading effect
of a determination of inadequacy that could result from recommending an unfair
settlement is a powerful check on any class counsel who might be considering
“selling out” a class in settlement.
23
See, e.g., Cent. States Se. & Sw. Areas Health & Welfare Fund v. MerckMedco Managed Care, LLC, 504 F.3d 229, 249 (2d Cir. 2007); In re Bank Am. Corp.
Sec. Litig., 350 F.3d 747, 751 (8th Cir. 2003); Reynolds v. Beneficial Nat’l Bank, 288
F.3d 277, 279–80 (7th Cir. 2002) (citing cases); In re Gen. Motors Pick-Up Truck
Fuel Tank Prod. Liab. Litig., 55 F.3d 768, 805 (3d Cir. 1995).
24
See, e.g., Weinberger v. Kendrick, 698 F.2d 61, 82 (2d Cir. 1982); In re Zoran
Corp. Derivative Litig., No. C 06-05503 WHA, 2008 WL 941897, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Apr.
7, 2008). This is particularly so when no litigation class has been certified, so that
the parties are seeking settlement approval and approval of a settlement class
simultaneously. See, e.g., In re Gen. Motors, 55 F.3d at 805 (stating that “courts
[must] . . . be even more scrupulous than usual” in such a context); Mars Steel Corp.
v. Cont’l Ill. Nat’l Bank & Trust Co., 834 F.2d 677, 682 (7th Cir. 1987).
25
See, e.g., Armstrong v. Bd. of Sch. Dirs. of Milwaukee, 616 F.2d 305, 314 (7th
Cir. 1980), overruled on other grounds, Felzen v. Andreas, 134 F.3d 873 (7th Cir.
1998); In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. Sales Practices Litig., 962 F. Supp. 450, 562
(D.N.J. 1997) (citation omitted), aff’d, 148 F.3d 283 (3d Cir. 1998); In re Motor Fuel
Temperature Sales Practices Litig., 258 F.R.D. 671, 675–76 (D. Kan. 2009); MANUAL
FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION, supra note 4, § 13.14.
26
See, e.g., In re NASDAQ Mkt. Makers Antitrust Litig., 929 F. Supp. 174, 177
(S.D.N.Y. 1996) (preliminary approval required if no “obvious deficiencies” in
proposed settlement); In re Elec. Data Sys. Corp. ERISA Litig., No. 6:03-MD-1512,
2005 WL 1875545, at *4 (E.D. Tex. June 30, 2005) (characterizing preliminary
approval review as a “cursory examination”).
27
See, e.g., Keene v. Coldwater Creek, Inc., No. C 07-05324 WHA, 2009 WL
1833992, at *1 (N.D. Cal. June 23, 2009) (noting denial of two prior applications for
preliminary settlement approval); Scott v. First Am. Title Ins. Co., Civil No. 06-cv286-JD, 2008 WL 2563460, at *1, *3 (D.N.H. June 24, 2008) (noting repeated denials
of motions for preliminary settlement approval); In re Zoran, 2008 WL 941897, at *2;
In re Chiron Corp. Sec. Litig., No. C-04-4293 VRW, 2007 WL 4249902, at *17–18
(N.D. Cal. Nov. 30, 2007); Figueroa v. Sharper Image Corp., 517 F. Supp. 2d 1292,
1299 (S.D. Fla. 2007) (noting denial of prior motion for preliminary settlement
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the arguments of both the parties and any objectors and
conscientiously determines whether the proposed settlement is
fair, reasonable, and adequate.28
The court’s oversight duty is stronger still when concerning
attorney fee awards to class counsel. In 2005, the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure were amended to add Rule 23(h). The
Advisory Committee note to that new rule states that “[a]ctive
judicial involvement in measuring fee awards is singularly
important to the proper operation of the class-action process.”29
A number of cases have quoted that note in evaluating fee
awards.30 The Advisory Committee emphasized that “[e]ven in
the absence of objections, the court bears this responsibility.”31
These structural protections for class members—two sets of
fiduciaries who have multiple motivations to prevent inadequate
settlements—are very robust. They virtually always ensure that
unfair or unreasonable settlements do not receive final
approval.32 As a result, objectors are rarely necessary, since they
normally do not tell judges anything that those judges do not

approval); In re Gilat Satellite Networks, Ltd., No. CV-02-1510 (CPS) (SMG), 2007
WL 2743675, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 18, 2007); Acosta v. Trans Union, LLC, 243
F.R.D. 377, 379 (C.D. Cal. 2007); Woullard v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., No.
1:06cv1057 LTS-RHW, 2007 WL 208519, at *4, *6 (S.D. Miss. Jan. 26, 2007);
Carnegie v. Household Int’l, Inc., 445 F. Supp. 2d 1032, 1033 (N.D. Ill. 2006) (noting
denial of two prior motions for preliminary settlement approval); Johnson v. GMAC
Mortgage Group, Inc., No. 04-cv-2004–LRR, 2006 WL 1071748, at *5 (N.D. Iowa Apr.
20, 2006); In re Elec. Data Sys., 2005 WL 1875545, at *6; Sutton v. Bernard, No. 00
C 6676, 2002 WL 1794048, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 5, 2002); In re Microsoft Corp.
Antitrust Litig., 185 F. Supp. 2d 519, 525, 530 (D. Md. 2002); cf. Laroque v. Domino’s
Pizza, LLC, 557 F. Supp. 2d 346, 348 (E.D.N.Y. 2008) (noting partial denial of
preliminary approval of collective action certification under Fair Labor Standards
Act).
28
See, e.g., MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION, supra note 4, § 21.634.
29
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(h) advisory committee’s note.
30
See, e.g., In re Rite Aid Corp. Sec. Litig., 396 F.3d 294, 307 (3d Cir. 2005);
Turner v. Murphy Oil USA, Inc., 472 F. Supp. 2d 830, 857 (E.D. La. 2007); In re
Cabletron Sys., Inc. Sec. Litig., 239 F.R.D. 30, 38 (D.N.H. 2006).
31
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(h) advisory committee’s note.
32
There are, of course, isolated and inevitable exceptions. See, e.g., In re Cmty.
Bank of N. Va., 418 F.3d 277, 311–12 (3d Cir. 2005) (criticizing district judge for
simply adopting findings and conclusions submitted by class counsel before having
reviewed them and indicating that class counsel might not be adequate
representatives of class). But in virtually every other case, class counsel and judges
have discharged their duties faithfully, as the system expects, even where
settlements have ultimately been found unacceptable. Rejection of a settlement does
not necessarily mean that class counsel, or a trial level judge, has betrayed duties to
the class.
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already perceive.33
Moreover, in 2005, Congress enacted
legislation that, among other things, directed that state
attorneys general or federal authorities receive notice of many
proposed settlements and have the opportunity to object to
them.34 These agencies, who act in the public interest and do not
seek to extort payments from the settling parties, likely serve
whatever useful function objectors can perform in such cases.35
B.

The Fallacy That Objectors Seek To Protect the Class, as
Opposed to the Personal Interests of the Objectors or Their
Counsel

The position that objectors are useful relies on the notion,
more theoretical than real, that class counsel and district courts
may fail to protect the class as required.36 Thus, class counsel
33
See, e.g., Parker v. Time Warner Entm’t Co., L.P., 631 F. Supp. 2d 242, 278
n.32 (E.D.N.Y. 2009) (stating that the court “read with amusement” objector’s
assertion that judge could not have read settlement papers and evaluated settlement
on his own). This is particularly so of objectors to class counsel’s attorney fees
requests. See infra notes 93–95, 101–02 and accompanying text. But it also applies
to objectors who complain about the merits of the settlement. Professional objectors
in particular often fail to read or understand the settlement to which they object. See
infra notes 68, 137 and accompanying text. Pro se objectors often lack the expertise
to understand all the components of and considerations underlying settlements
despite the detailed notices that accompany them and the ability to telephone class
counsel to get more information.
34
28 U.S.C. § 1715(b) (2006). These agencies are often underfunded and
overburdened, leading to the need for “private attorneys general” such as class
counsel to enforce the law. See, e.g., Deposit Guar. Nat’l Bank of Jackson v. Roper,
445 U.S. 326, 339 (1980) (“The aggregation of individual claims in . . . a classwide
suit is an evolutionary response to the existence of injuries unremedied by the
regulatory action of the government.”); cf. Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff &
Assoc., Inc., 483 U.S. 143, 151 (1987) (noting the pressure brought by private
attorneys general “on a serious national problem for which public prosecutorial
resources are deemed inadequate”). However, these regulatory authorities are more
likely to respond to specific and detailed invitations to comment on or object to class
action settlements. Indeed, that has happened in at least one case, which led to the
rejection of a proposed settlement. Figueroa v. Sharper Image Corp., 517 F. Supp. 2d
1292, 1328 (S.D. Fla. 2007).
35
See Brunet, supra note 7, at 449–56 (describing activities and capabilities of
state and federal government agencies in objecting to class action settlements).
36
Much of the academic concern about the conduct of class counsel and the
courts arose from celebrated mass tort litigation in the 1990s, especially asbestos
class actions. See, e.g., Georgine v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 83 F.3d 610, 629–30 (3d
Cir. 1996), aff’d sub nom. Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997);
Ahearn v. Fibreboard Corp., 162 F.R.D. 505, 507–08 (N.D. Tex. 1995) (discussing a
private firm that also handled asbestos cases and a legal clinic that was a subsidiary
of a maritime law firm), aff’d sub nom. In re Asbestos Litig., 90 F.3d 963, 968 (5th
Cir. 1996), rev’d sub nom. Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 821 (1999);
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might allow their own financial interests in a fee that will result
from any settlement, even an inadequate one, to override their
duties to their clients, the class.37 Additionally, some judges may
abandon their own duty and simply rubber-stamp what the
settling parties present to dispose of a burdensome matter or to
advance their own secret substantive agenda.38
But actual experience shows that these cynical concerns
about class counsel and the judiciary are virtually never realized.
On the contrary, class counsel take on risky cases on an entirely
contingent basis, against well-funded defendants represented by
top-flight counsel.39 Class counsel advance vast sums in out-ofpocket expenses and invest their time over periods of many
years.40 Only if they succeed by trial or a settlement that must
be approved by the court do they earn a fee. Even that fee must
likewise obtain judicial approval, after notice to the class and
“beady-eyed scrutiny” by the court.41 Indeed, class counsel who
betray their clients risk sanctions,42 malpractice actions,43 or even
Coffee, supra note 22, at 372–74 (focusing on mass tort and non-opt out class actions
while addressing broader issues); Susan P. Koniak, Feasting While the Widow
Weeps: Georgine v. Amchem Products, Inc., 80 CORNELL L. REV. 1045, 1047–49
(1995) (attacking the ethics of class counsel in Georgine, by a paid expert witness on
behalf of settlement objectors); Symposium, Mass Torts: Serving Up Just Desserts,
80 CORNELL L. REV. 811 (1995). But the theoretical foundation was provided earlier
by Professor John C. Coffee, Jr. in a number of articles, some of which date back to
the 1980s. See, e.g., Coffee, supra note 22; John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Wars: The
Dilemma of the Mass Tort Class Action, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1343 (1995); John C.
Coffee, Jr., Understanding the Plaintiff’s Attorney: The Implications of Economic
Theory for Private Enforcement of Law Through Class and Derivative Actions, 86
COLUM. L. REV. 669 (1986).
37
See, e.g., Reynolds v. Beneficial Nat’l Bank, 288 F.3d 277, 282 (7th Cir. 2002).
38
See, e.g., Charles W. Wolfram, Mass Torts-Messy Ethics, 80 CORNELL L. REV.
1228, 1233 (1995). For an apparent example of such rubber-stamping, see In re
Cmty. Bank of N. Va., 418 F.3d 277, 300–01 (3d Cir. 2005).
39
Courts often recognize that class actions are very risky and that class counsel
must fight against excellent lawyers for defendants. See, e.g., In re WorldCom, Inc.
Sec. Litig., 388 F. Supp. 2d 319, 357–59 (S.D.N.Y. 2005); In re Lucent Tech., Inc. Sec.
Litig., 327 F. Supp. 2d 426, 436–37 (D.N.J. 2004); In re Ikon Office Sys., Inc. Sec.
Litig., 194 F.R.D. 166, 194–95 (E.D. Pa. 2000) (discussing that securities fraud cases
are difficult, and Private Securities Litigation Reform Act made them more so, and
stating that defense counsel had “a fine reputation” and “displayed great skill”). See
also supra note 8 and accompanying text.
40
See infra notes 70, 99 and accompanying text.
41
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e), (h); Reynolds, 288 F.3d at 286 (7th Cir. 2002) (stating
that fee requests are to receive “beady-eyed scrutiny”).
42
The criminal proceedings brought against the Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes
& Lerach firm and several of its top members, which resulted in guilty pleas and jail
sentences for the members, are an extreme example of this. See, e.g., Michael
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their licenses. There is no reason to presume that class counsel
would risk such consequences. Judges, too, normally do their
duty.44 In the usual case, therefore, there is little need for
objectors to look over the shoulders of class counsel and the court.
In reality, objectors and professional objector counsel often
surface because they can profit by doing so.45 Objectors can

Parrish, Leading Class-Action Lawyer Is Sentenced to Two Years in Kickback
Scheme, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 12, 2008, at C3 (discussing sentencing of William Lerach
for concealing illegal payments to the firm’s clients in class action cases).
43
See generally Huber v. Taylor, 532 F.3d 237 (3d Cir. 2008) (legal malpractice
action arising out of alleged breaches of duty to plaintiff clients by defendant
attorneys); Susan P. Koniak & George M. Cohen, Under Cloak of Settlement, 82 VA.
L. REV. 1051, 1057 (1996) (“In short, our answer to class action abuse is ‘sue the
bastards.’ ”).
44
See, e.g., Richardson v. United States, 468 U.S. 317, 331 (1984) (expressing
the belief that “judges faithfully honor their obligations to enforce applicable state
and federal laws”); Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 611 (1975) (refusing to
assume that “judges will not be faithful to their constitutional responsibilities”).
Some scholars have concluded, however, that relying on trial judges to scrutinize
settlements is “sure to fail.” See, e.g., Coffee, supra note 22, at 438; Koniak & Cohen,
supra note 43, at 1122–28. But if that were so, it would be expected that trial judges
would virtually never deny preliminary settlement approval at a time when no
objectors are yet present, and the parties should, according to critics of the judicial
role, be able to have their way with allegedly pliable, uninformed, biased, lazy, or
corrupt judges. That is particularly so since preliminary approval does little more
than direct that notice of settlement—for which one or both settling parties pay—be
given to the class and open a proposed settlement to more searching review at a final
hearing. Thus, it should be very easy for a trial level judge to grant preliminary
settlement approval, since the court incurs no cost by doing so and, if anything,
advances its supposed overriding interest in facilitating settlements so as to clear its
docket of a potentially burdensome matter. Yet, it is not difficult to find examples of
courts denying preliminary settlement approval. See supra note 27 and
accompanying text. The preliminary approval laboratory demonstrates the vitality of
judicial review of proposed settlements, as do the not insignificant number of cases
in which judges have awarded a reduced fee to class counsel even though there were
no objections to the requested fees. See infra note 102. Such rulings go against the
notion that judges’ need for approval from lawyers in the settled cases and others
who might later appear before them leads judges to accept settlements and counsel
fee applications uncritically. See, e.g., Koniak & Cohen, supra note 43, at 1127.
45
See, e.g., Barnes v. Fleetboston Fin. Corp., No. 01-10395-NG, 2006 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 71072, at *3 (D. Mass. Aug. 22, 2006) (“Repeat objectors to class action
settlements can make a living simply by filing frivolous appeals and thereby slowing
down the execution of settlements.”); Spark v. MBNA Corp., 289 F. Supp. 2d 510,
514 (D. Del. 2003) (stating that groundless objection by serial objector counsel
“appears to be nothing more than an attempt to receive attorneys’ fees”).

84 St. John’s L. Rev. 949 (2010)

2010]

KEEPING THE FLIES OUT OF THE OINTMENT

961

sometimes wangle special consideration for themselves.46 But,
more importantly, objector counsel can collect fees for filing
objections, in at least two ways.
First, objector counsel can negotiate for payment of a fee as
part of their clients’ agreement to withdraw their objections,
regardless of the merits of those objections.47 Such payments
often bear no relationship whatsoever to the actual time
expended by such counsel since, unlike class counsel who seek a
fee award from a court,48 objector counsel frequently do not
submit time records for judicial scrutiny or document their
claimed fee in any other way.49 The amount of the fee paid to
objector counsel in exchange for going away is purely a matter of
negotiation, in which objectors can take full advantage of the
leverage that the threat of delay alone poses to the settling
parties.50

46
See, e.g., Patrick Woolley, Rethinking the Adequacy of Adequate
Representation, 75 TEX. L. REV. 571, 618 (1997).
47
See, e.g., Vollmer v. Selden, 350 F.3d 656, 660 (7th Cir. 2003) (noting that
objectors may “intervene and cause expensive delay in the hope of getting paid to go
away”); MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION, supra note 4 (“An objection, even of little
merit, can be costly and significantly delay implementation of a class settlement.”).
48
In general, there are two bases for a fee award to class counsel. The “lodestar
method” is based on the number of hours reasonably billed, which class counsel must
document for the court, multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate, subject to further
adjustment, such as an enhancement by a multiplier. See infra text accompanying
note 165. The “percentage of the fund” method awards class counsel a percentage of
the settlement common fund or common benefit that counsel’s efforts helped to
create. See generally Brytus v. Spang & Co., 203 F.3d 238, 242 (3d Cir. 2000)
(discussing lodestar and percentage methods). Even where a percentage award is
made, courts often use the lodestar as a “cross-check.” See, e.g., In re AT&T Corp.
Sec. Litig., 455 F.3d 160, 164 (3d Cir. 2006) (recommending such a cross-check);
Vizcaino v. Microsoft Corp., 290 F.3d 1043, 1050 (9th Cir. 2002). Thus, though class
counsel are not required to submit detailed time records to support a percentage
award, see, e.g., In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. Sales Practices Litig. Agent Actions,
148 F.3d 283, 342 (3d Cir. 1998), some evidence of their actual time expended is
always before the court in order to enable the “lodestar cross-check.”
49
See, e.g., Mirfasihi v. Fleet Mortgage Corp., No. 01 C 722, 2007 WL 2608778,
at *7 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 6, 2007), aff’d, 551 F.3d 682 (7th Cir. 2008), cert. denied sub
nom. Perry v. Mirfasihi, 129 S. Ct. 2767 (2009); Perez v. Asurion Corp., No. 0620734-CIV, 2007 WL 2591174, at *1–2 (S.D. Fla. July 18, 2007); In re WorldCom,
Inc. Sec. Litig., No. 02 Civ.3288 (DLC), 2006 WL 1722573, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. June 20,
2006) (stating that objector counsel failed to submit time records to support demand
for over $100,000 in fees even after court specifically requested such records); Spark,
289 F. Supp. 2d at 514 n.5.
50
See Barnes, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 71072, at *3–4.
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Second, objector counsel have been awarded fees for purely
cosmetic “improvements” to a settlement, or for merely
“sharpening the issues” for the court without having enhanced
the settlement.51 In such instances, objector counsel demand
either a portion of the additional value that the “improvement” to
the settlement can be said to be worth or a large portion of the
attorney fees that class counsel earned through years of risky
litigation that resulted in the questioned settlement, while
objector counsel sat on the sidelines or failed in their own
litigation against the defendant.52 Particularly in cases in which
a large fee may be in the offing for class counsel, settlements
make an inviting target for rapacious professional objectors.53

51

See infra notes 154–57 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., In re Holocaust Victim Assets Litig., 424 F.3d 150, 155 (2d Cir. 2005)
(objector’s counsel demanded a fee almost equal to the fee granted to class counsel);
Mirfasihi, 2007 WL 2608778, at *7 n.5 (stating that objector’s counsel demanded one
hundred percent of fee awarded to class counsel); New England Carpenters Health
Benefits Fund v. First Databank, Inc., No. 05-11148-PBS, 2009 WL 3418628, at *1
(D. Mass. Oct. 20, 2009) (stating that objector’s counsel demanded over $28,000 in
fees for objecting to class counsel’s request for fee of $84,000,000); Parker v. Time
Warner Entm’t Co., 631 F. Supp. 2d 242, 278 (E.D.N.Y. 2009) (stating that objector
demanded over $860,000 in fees, which was over twenty five percent of the fee award
to successful class counsel); Azizian v. Federated Dep’t Stores, Inc., No. C-03-3359
SBA, 2006 WL 4037549, at *2, *5 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 29, 2006) (stating that objector
counsel sought 12.5% of the class counsel fee and labeling that request “exorbitant”);
Great Neck Capital Appreciation Inv. P’ship, L.P. v. Pricewaterhousecoopers, L.L.P.,
212 F.R.D. 400, 416 (E.D. Wis. 2002) (stating that objector sought ten percent of the
class counsel fee, which court found excessive); In re Domestic Air Transp. Antitrust
Litig., 148 F.R.D. 297, 359 (N.D. Ga. 1993) (rejecting one objector’s fee request as
“exorbitant” and “excessive”). This happens with particular frequency in the context
of objections to class counsel fees. If the court awards less than class counsel
requested, objectors demand outlandish percentages of the reduction for themselves.
See, e.g., Mirfasihi v. Fleet Mortgage Corp., 551 F.3d 682, 687 (7th Cir. 2008) (court
labeled “chutzpah” and “preposterous” objector counsel’s demand that entire fee
awarded to class counsel be transferred to objectors); In re Cardinal Health, Inc. Sec.
Litig., 550 F. Supp. 2d 751, 753 (S.D. Ohio 2008) (court reduced class counsel fee
request by $37 million; one objector sought eighteen percent of that amount, or $6.66
million, while another demanded ten percent, amounting to $3.7 million); Spark, 289
F. Supp. 2d at 513 (stating that objector sought 10.17% of fee reduction).
53
See In re Cardinal Health, 550 F. Supp. 2d at 754 (“[O]pportunistic
objectors . . . now seem to accompany every major securities litigation.”); Azizian,
2006 WL 4037549, at *9 (“The announcement of a large settlement in a class action
involving widely used products, with $24,000,000 for attorneys’ fees and costs often
attracts other lawyers who had nothing to do with the instigation of the case to see if
they might make some changes in the settlement agreement; thereby, permitting
them to participate in the award of attorneys’ fees and costs.”); Barnes, 2006 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 71072, at *3–4 (“Because of these economic realities, professional
objectors can levy what is effectively a tax on class action settlements, a tax that has
52
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Thus, perversely, professional objectors have purely monetary
incentives to find even a quibble to raise in opposition to a
settlement—even as class counsel and the court are bound to
ensure that the settlement is within the range of
reasonableness.54
Many courts have perceived that objectors often file mere
“generic, unhelpful protests.”55 Examples of professional objector
counsel filing boilerplate papers, sometimes without even
changing the names of parties from one case to the next, are

no benefit to anyone other than the objectors.”). Perhaps for this reason, professional
objector counsel seem to travel in packs, with the same counsel surfacing together in
many of the same cases. See, e.g., In re Warfarin Sodium Antitrust Litig., 391 F.3d
516, 520–21 (3d Cir. 2004); Varacallo v. Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 226 F.R.D. 207, 212
(D.N.J. 2005); Azizian, 2006 WL 4037549, at *5 (illustrating that there are many of
the same objector counsel on counsel lists in these cases and listing many of the
most ubiquitous professional objectors). Since those professional objectors rarely, if
ever, are found to have presented valid arguments, any alternative explanation that
they all appear in the same cases because those settlements are inadequate is not
sustainable. The selfish interest of professional objectors in extorting fees also
explains why some scholarly analyses say that most class action settlements have no
objectors. See, e.g., THOMAS E. WILLGING, LAURAL L. HOOPER & ROBERT J. NIEMIC,
EMPIRICAL STUDY OF CLASS ACTIONS IN FOUR FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS: FINAL
REPORT TO THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES 178 (Fed. Judicial Ctr. 1996)
(stating that between forty-two and sixty-four percent of settlements saw no
objections); Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey Miller, The Role of Opt-Outs and
Objectors in Class Action Litigation: Theoretical and Empirical Issues, 57 VAND. L.
REV. 1529 (2004) (collecting data showing few or no objectors in many cases). Run-ofthe-mill, smaller settlements, whether reasonable or not, entail smaller fees to class
counsel, rather than the fat fee target that professional objectors seek, so that
professional objectors are not motivated to scrutinize those smaller settlements.
54
Some objectors have seized on typos or other technical glitches in the
settlement documents as a basis for objections, even though the settlement terms
were otherwise clear, and, in any event, any confusion caused by the typos could
have been resolved by contacting class counsel or a settlement administrator. See,
e.g., DeHoyos v. Allstate Corp., 240 F.R.D. 269, 317 (W.D. Tex. 2007); Varacallo, 226
F.R.D. at 227.
55
Devlin v. Scardelletti, 536 U.S. 1, 23 n.5 (2002) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing
Shaw v. Toshiba Am. Info. Sys., Inc., 91 F. Supp. 2d 942, 973 (E.D. Tex. 2000); see
also Perez v. Asurion Corp., 501 F. Supp. 2d 1360, 1379 (S.D. Fla. 2007) (stating that
objectors offered only “generic compilations of well-known case law and . . . standard
form arguments filed in other cases”); In re Indep. Energy Holdings PLC Sec. Litig.,
No. 00 Civ.6689 SAS, 2003 WL 22801724, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 24, 2003) (stating
that objectors’ submissions were “boilerplate and routine. Moreover, this was not the
first time these counsel have appeared for objectors and raised nearly identical
objections.”); Shaw, 91 F. Supp. 2d at 973; Varacallo, 226 F.R.D. at 247–48 (“For the
most part, these objections are general laments about the perceived unfairness of the
Proposed Settlement.”).
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legion.56 Courts have labeled these objectors and their counsel as
“spoilers,”57 “naysayers,”58 and “professional objectors.”59 More
pointedly, a growing number of courts state that professional
objectors are “gnawing on a bone”60 by filing objections in order to
“extract a fee” from the settling parties.61
56
See, e.g., In re Holocaust Victim Assets Litig., 311 F. Supp. 2d 363, 372, 381–
82 (E.D.N.Y. 2004) (objector’s counsel simply retooled research done by his client for
another case), aff’d, 424 F.3d 150, 154 (2d Cir. 2005); In re AOL Time Warner, Inc.,
Sec. & ERISA Litig., No. MDL 1500, 02 Civ. 5575(SWK), 2006 WL 903236, at *17
n.22 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 6, 2006) (noting that criticism of objector’s counsel as submitting
“canned objections” might be correct, since he had copied whole sentences from prior
judicial opinion without attribution); Shaw, 91 F. Supp. 2d at 973 (criticizing
objector counsel for filing “canned” objection); see also Varacallo, 226 F.R.D. at 241
n.22 (recognizing that “many of the objections that have been raised by the so-called
‘professional objectors’ have been raised in other courts in other class actions”).
57
Lobatz v. U.S. W. Cellular of Cal., Inc., 222 F.3d 1142, 1148 (9th Cir. 2000);
Torrisi v. Tucson Elec. Power Co., 8 F.3d 1370, 1378 (9th Cir. 1993).
58
In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. Sales Practices Litig., 962 F. Supp. 450, 564
(D.N.J. 1997), aff’d, 148 F.3d 283 (3d Cir. 1998).
59
See, e.g., O’Keefe v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC, 214 F.R.D. 266, 295 n.26 (E.D.
Pa. 2003); Shaw, 91 F. Supp. 2d at 973; see also In re Royal Ahold N.V. Sec. &
ERISA Litig., 461 F. Supp. 2d 383, 386 (D. Md. 2006) (labeling an objector counsel a
“professional and generally unsuccessful objector”); In re Compact Disc Minimum
Advertised Price Antitrust Litig., No. MDL 1361, 2003 WL 22417252, at *2 n.3 (D.
Me. Oct. 7, 2003) (labeling same objectors’ attorney as a “repeat objector”).
60
Snell v. Allianz Life Ins. Co. of N. Am., No. Civ. 97-2784 RLE, 2000 WL
1336640, at *10 (D. Minn. Sept. 8, 2000).
61
Shaw, 91 F. Supp. 2d at 973. For comparably direct characterizations of
professional objectors, see, for example, In re UnitedHealth Group, Inc. PSLRA
Litig., 643 F. Supp. 2d 1107, 1109 (D. Minn. 2009) (“[Objector counsel’s] goal was,
and is, to hijack as many dollars for themselves as they can wrest from a negotiated
settlement.”); UFCW Local 880-Retail Food Employers Joint Pension Fund v.
Newmont Mining Corp., No. 05-cv-01046-MSK-BNB, 2008 WL 4452332, at *3 (D.
Colo. Sept. 30, 2008) (attacking objectors “who challenge fee requests largely in the
hopes of obtaining their own personal payout”), aff’d, 352 F. App’x 232 (10th Cir.
2009); In re Cardinal Health, Inc. Sec. Litig., 550 F. Supp. 2d 751, 754 (S.D. Ohio
2008) (criticizing “opportunistic objectors”); see also In re Holocaust Victim Assets,
311 F. Supp. 2d at 374–75, 381 (stating that, objector, as his counsel sat by, asked
trial judge how much he would pay in attorney fees and other monies for objector not
to appeal settlement approval and that trial court labeled this “blackmail[ ]” and a
“hold-up”); In re Rent-Way Sec. Litig., 305 F. Supp. 2d 491, 520 n.12 (W.D. Pa. 2003)
(noting, but not adjudicating, an allegation that objector counsel had telephoned
class counsel and had attempted extortion at that time). Scholars have used
comparable terms. See, e.g., CIVIL RULES ADVISORY COMMITTEE, JUDICIAL
CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, REPORT OF THE CIVIL RULES ADVISORY
COMMITTEE 182–83 (Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, May 20, 2002)
(referring to “the standard extortionist [objector] tactic” of threatening an appeal of
settlement approval unless class counsel gives objector counsel a share of the class
counsel fee); Woolley, supra note 46, at 618 (“By filing or threatening to file an
objection to the settlement, a class member may be able to ‘extort’ a settlement that
represents a disproportionate amount of the settlement fund.”); Richard B. Schmitt,
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It is certainly easy enough for “observers, who peer from
outside the settlement process, [to] second-guess one detail, or
another.”62 Objector counsel are often attorneys who did not risk
any of their own time or capital in suing the defendant but
attempt to take for themselves a portion of the attorney fees
earned by the class counsel who successfully took on the
defendant.63 Such objector counsel merely “argue[ ] the nuances
of the settlement during the twilight of [the] litigation,” instead
of litigating against the defendants for years and “shoulder[ing]
the financial burden of pursuing the action.”64 In other instances,
objector counsel are those who brought their own cases against
the defendant but failed to achieve any success and seek to
recoup their time and expense from those attorneys who did
succeed.65
Objecting to Class-Action Pacts Can Be Lucrative For Attorneys, WALL ST. J., Jan.
10, 1997, at B1 (quoting Professor Susan Koniak as labeling the tactics of objectors
as “an extortion game”).
62
Snell, 2000 WL 1336640, at *10.
63
See In re Cardinal Health, 550 F. Supp. 2d at 754 (stating that objectors
“subsist primarily off the skill and labor of, to say nothing of the risk borne by, more
capable attorneys”); Azizian v. Federated Dep’t Stores, Inc., No. C-03-3359 SBA,
2006 WL 4037549, at *9 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 29, 2006) (stating that a large settlement
“often attracts other lawyers who had nothing to do with the instigation of the case
to see if they might make some changes in the settlement agreement; thereby,
permitting them to participate in the award of attorneys’ fees and costs”). Class
counsel in one Illinois state court class action expressed this view very colorfully:
“Attorneys who specialize in objecting rather than performing could not have
achieved these results. This is a classic example of the maxim: ‘Those who can do,
those who can’t, criticize.’ ” Plaintiff’s Memorandum in Support of Final Approval of
Class, Block v. McDonald’s Corp., 355 Ill. App. 3d 1174 (Mar. 31, 2005), available at
www.edcombs.com/CM/Notices/Notices187.asp.
64
In re Domestic Air Transp. Antitrust Litig., 148 F.R.D. 297, 359 (N.D. Ga.
1993); see also Mirfasihi v. Fleet Mortgage Corp., 551 F.3d 682, 687 (7th Cir. 2008)
(noting that objector counsel “did not propose terms of settlement or otherwise
participate constructively in the litigation other than to appeal”).
65
Rhonda Wasserman, Dueling Class Actions, 80 B.U. L. REV. 461, 482–83 &
n.97 (2000) (noting that counsel in competing class actions are prime candidates to
object to settlements “out of self-interest”); see, e.g., Rutter & Wilbanks Corp. v. Shell
Oil Co., 314 F.3d 1180, 1183–84 (10th Cir. 2002); In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am.
Sales Practices Litig., 148 F.3d 283, 318 (3d Cir. 1998) (finding that district court did
not err in discounting objections of counsel in competing or overlapping class
actions); In re Currency Conversion Fee Antitrust Litig., 263 F.R.D. 110, 132
(S.D.N.Y. 2009) (“[T]he principal thrust by [objector counsel] was to preserve the
viability [of] their separate tag-along state court actions. As such, their objections
were motivated entirely by self-interest and of no utility to the Class.”); In re
Katrina Canal Breaches Consol. Litig., 263 F.R.D. 340, 363 (E.D. La. 2009) (noting
that some objectors had state court actions that would be enjoined by settlement, so
they “have an incentive to object to this settlement”); Figueroa v. Sharper Image
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Perhaps the most outlandish situation occurs when objector
counsel, on behalf of a class member who has not filed his or her
own case—and therefore could not recover anything absent a
classwide resolution—attacks the ability of a class to be
certified.66 In that instance, professional objectors actually act
against the interest of their own clients.67 But objector counsel
themselves can profit from attacking settlement class
certification, since the parties may pay those counsel a fee to
drop their objections. It is relatively simple for professional
objectors to find some respect in which one or more of the many
criteria for class certification can be questioned, and it is far
easier to do that than to become familiar with the often
voluminous discovery or the details of the settlement
agreement.68
Corp., 517 F. Supp. 2d 1292, 1315 (S.D. Fla. 2007) (noting contention of settlement
proponents that “the small and vocal minority of class members who have objected
are fueled by would-be class counsel in competing lawsuits”). However, the relatively
rarer instance in which objector counsel has achieved some success in a competing
case--such as a finding of liability--which would be negated by a proposed settlement
of a different, less advanced case, may call for a different, more favorable view of
that objector. See, e.g., Smith v. Sprint Commc’ns L.P., 387 F.3d 612, 614–15 (7th
Cir. 2004) (noting that objector represented competing statewide classes that had
been certified, had established liability, and was on eve of trial, and rejecting
nationwide settlement on grounds that settlement proponents did not adequately
represent certified statewide classe). In such circumstances, the court may be facing
a “reverse auction,” in which a defendant facing multiple class actions “picks the
most ineffectual class lawyers to negotiate a settlement with in the hope that the
district court will approve a weak settlement that will preclude other claims against
the defendant.” Reynolds v. Beneficial Nat’l Bank, 288 F.3d 277, 282 (7th Cir. 2002).
66
See infra notes 112–16 and accompanying text.
67
Professor Brunet has noted “the problem of monitoring the monitor.” Brunet,
supra note 7, at 409. “Clients of counsel who object may be unable to monitor their
own attorneys effectively. Some objecting by attorneys who represent small stakes
plaintiffs may be only an effort to obtain attorneys fees’ [sic] for the objecting
attorney.” id.; see also id. at 425–26.
68
Objector counsel frequently fail to apprise themselves sufficiently about the
settlement, so that courts are compelled to note that those counsel misunderstood
the settlement about which they complain. See, e.g., In re Holocaust Victim Assets
Litig, 311 F. Supp. 2d 363, 369 (E.D.N.Y. 2004), aff’d, 424 F.3d 150 (2d Cir. 2005).
For other cases in which courts found that objectors simply did not understand the
settlement, see infra note 137. In most cases, objectors do not seek discovery of the
underlying litigation file, and, often, even when they do, they fail to take advantage
of the ability to review that material. See, e.g., In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. Sales
Practices Litig., 962 F. Supp. 450, 563 (D.N.J. 1997) (stating that objector counsel
spent only three days in the document depository, where over one million discovery
documents were available), aff’d, 148 F.3d 283 (3d Cir. 1998). Objectors can get
access to the file material without preconditions, see ALBA CONTE & HERBERT
NEWBERG, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS, §8:32, at 268 (4th ed. 2002), other than
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Even a baseless objection can delay the implementation of a
proposed settlement.69 As a result, diligent class counsel may
agree to “pay off” a professional objector to ensure that their
clients, the class members, get relief quickly once a settlement is
finally achieved after many years of litigation.70 Defendants too
have an interest in removing impediments to an agreed upon
settlement, so that they can put the litigation behind them.71
signing on to a confidentiality order that is the essentially the same as that
governing class counsel. Thus, assertions that objectors’ alleged inability to review
discovery prevents them from learning about the settlement are without merit.
69
See, e.g., In re AT&T Corp. Sec. Litig., Civ. No. 00-5364(GEB), 2006 WL
2786945, at *2 (D.N.J. Sept. 26, 2006) (stating that since objections were “without
merit . . . [and] appear to have impeded the Class’s recovery—[those] objections and
subsequent appeal resulted in wasteful litigation and delayed the distribution of
funds to the Class”). Other cases have noted that objectors have hindered rather
than helped the process. See, e.g., Mirfasihi, 2007 WL 2608778, at *6–7 (reducing fee
by fifty percent for objectors who “burdened the court at least as much as they have
helped it” despite having benefited the class and the community); In re Prudential
Ins. Co. of Am. Sales Practices Litig., 273 F. Supp. 2d 563, 570 (D.N.J. 2003) (noting
that objector counsel seemingly “did everything he could to make this matter as
inefficient and contentious as possible” and was “often more of an unjustifiable
hindrance to the progression of this litigation”); Gerstein v. Micron Tech., Inc., Civ.
No. 89-1262, 1993 WL 735031, at *1 (D. Ida. Jan. 9, 1993); In re Anchor Sec. Litig.,
No. CV-88-3024, 1991 WL 53651, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 8, 1991) (noting that objector
had “clouded rather than sharpened the issues”); Saylor v. Bastedo, 594 F. Supp.
371, 375 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (awarding no counsel fee for objector who “hindered rather
than promoted the prosecution of this action”).
70
See, e.g., Mike Absmeier, The Professional Objector and Revised Rule 23:
Protecting Voice Rights While Limiting Objector Abuse, 24 REV. LITIG. 609, 627
(2005). Class actions routinely consume many years. See, e.g., Vizcaino v. Microsoft
Corp., 290 F.3d 1043, 1046 (9th Cir. 2002) (lasting over ten years); Varacallo v.
Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 226 F.R.D. 207, 253 (D.N.J. 2005) (lasting over eight years).
After all that time, “jeopardizing a settlement agreement causes prejudice to the
existing parties to a lawsuit,” see In re NASDAQ Market-Makers Antitrust Litig.,
187 F.R.D. 465, 490 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (quoting United States v. Bowes, 25 F.3d 66, 72
(2d Cir. 1994)), which often leads class counsel to buy off professional objectors
rather than delaying still longer the settlement benefits to class members.
71
Ironically, defendants themselves are partially to blame for the plague of
objectors. Defendants’ interests have generated a flood of criticism of class actions
and the attorneys who bring them. For example, the so-called Class Action Fairness
Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (codified in scattered sections of 28
U.S.C.), was propelled by years of extensive lobbying and anti-class action
propaganda from corporate interests. See, e.g., Public Citizen Congress Watch,
Unfairness Incorporated: The Corporate Campaign Against Consumer Class Actions,
1, 18 (June 2003), available at www.citizen.org/documents/ACF2813.pdf (reporting
that over 475 lobbyists for major corporations, many of whom were the subject of
class action litigation, had lobbied for anti-class action legislation). As The Wall
Street Journal stated after President Bush signed the bill into law, “[t]o a
remarkable degree, the business lobby was able to set the tone of the debate with a
steady drumbeat of anecdotes portraying wealthy trial lawyers making off with large
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Objectors play on this to extract a fee. In their zeal to find
anything at all to object to, professional objectors sometimes
make inconsistent arguments within the same objection.72
The right to object to a settlement can be a useful
supplement to the other structural protections. Legitimate
objectors can bring a measure of adversarialness to the
settlement stage of a case.73 They can “keep the parties honest”
by pointing out those rare occasions when a settlement is unfair
or when a settlement creates conflicts within the settlement
class.
But the right to object, though an essential right of class
members, is easily abused. Professional objectors seek out cases
that offer them the ability to extort a fee rather than cases in
which an unreasonable settlement is proposed.74 Courts must
settlements at the expense of not only corporations but their customers.” David
Rogers & Monica Langley, Bush Set To Sign Landmark Bill on Class Action, WALL
ST. J., Feb. 18, 2005, at A1. By making all class actions, class counsel, and class
settlements suspect, defendants’ interests unwittingly emboldened objectors to try to
block settlements that defendants seek to have approved.
72
See, e.g., In re AOL Time Warner ERISA Litig., No. 02 Cv. 8853(SWK), 2007
WL 4225486, at *3 n.4 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 28, 2007); DeHoyos v. Allstate Corp., 240
F.R.D. 269, 319 (W.D. Tex. 2007); Varacallo v. Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 226 F.R.D.
207, 235 n.19 (D.N.J. 2005); In re Corel Corp. Sec. Litig., 293 F. Supp. 2d 484, 497
(E.D. Pa. 2003) (all noting and criticizing inconsistent arguments made by
professional objector counsel).
73
See, e.g., Vollmer v. Selden, 350 F.3d 656, 660 (7th Cir. 2003); In re Cardinal
Health, Inc. Sec. Litig., 550 F. Supp. 2d 751, 753 (S.D. Ohio 2008); In re Indep.
Energy Holdings P.L.C. Sec. Litig., No. 00 Civ. 6689 SAS, 2003 WL 22801724, at *1–
2 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 24, 2003); Great Neck Capital Appreciation Inv. P’ship, L.P. v.
Pricewaterhousecoopers, L.L.P., 212 F.R.D. 400, 412–13 (E.D. Wis. 2002); In re
Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. Sales Practices Litig., 278 F.3d 175, 201–03 (3d Cir. 2002)
(Rosenn, J., dissenting). However, cases that assign a high value to mere
“adversarialness,” unmoored to whether a court would perceive on its own the issues
that professional objectors raise, are mistaken. Just as class counsel do not earn a
fee for creating “adversarialness” by filing a case, professional objectors should not
receive a fee merely for appearing in opposition to a settlement. See infra notes 162–
64 and accompanying text.
74
Indeed, in the landmark egregious cases where settlements were overturned,
professional objectors played no role in doing that. Instead, the successful objectors
were academics, public interest organizations, government agencies, or private
attorneys who had comparable cases pending but made their living from such cases
rather than by objecting to settlements. See, e.g., Georgine v. Amchem Prods., Inc.,
157 F.R.D. 246, 286, 296–97, 302–04, 306, 313 (E.D. Pa. 1994) (noting that private
attorneys who had other cases represented objectors, with several law professors as
their experts; White Lung Association of New Jersey also represented objectors, and
Trial Lawyers for Public Justice was amicus in opposition to settlement), vacated 83
F.3d 610 (3d Cir. 1996), aff’d sub nom. Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591
(1997) (noting that other law professors sought, but were denied, status of amicus in
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discern which objections have potential validity and which are
filed merely for selfish leverage.75 Objectors and objections that
aid the court by providing information or arguments that the
court would not otherwise have or perceive can be useful.76
Objectors who do not meet that standard should be viewed
opposition to settlement); In re Gen. Motors Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liab.
Litig., 55 F.3d 768, 775–76 (3d Cir. 1995) (noting that Public Citizen Litigation
Group, Center for Auto Safety, and several public agencies, along with a few private
lawyers, represented objectors); Ahearn v. Fibreboard Corp., 162 F.R.D. 505, 508
(E.D. Tex. 1995) (noting that private firm that also handled asbestos cases and a
legal clinic that was a subsidiary of a maritime law firm represented objectors), aff’d
sub nom. In re Asbestos Litig., 90 F.3d 963 (5th Cir. 1996), rev’d sub nom. Ortiz v.
Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815 (1999); see also John Leubsdorf, Co-Opting the Class
Action, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 1222, 1222 (1995). The same is true of a poster child for
alleged class action abuse, Kamilewicz v. Bank of Boston Corp., 92 F.3d 506 (7th Cir.
1996), which figured prominently in the campaign to adopt the Class Action
Fairness Act of 2005. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 109-14, at 14 (Feb. 28, 2005), (referring to
the settlement as “now infamous”). That case arose from an underlying decision of
an Alabama state court judge to approve a settlement in which class members’ bank
accounts were charged an amount for their attorney fees that exceeded the amounts,
if any, that they were awarded under the settlement. See generally id. at 14–15;
Koniak & Cohen, supra note 43, at 1057–80 (detailing facts of settlement). The
objectors there were the Florida Attorney General and a large private firm whom
Professor Koniak asked to get involved. Id. at 1057 n.16, 1082 n.103; see also id. at
1272 (noting that nine state attorneys general participated as amici in the Seventh
Circuit in support of the settled class). Many of the settlements that cause the
greatest concern to scholars are those that arise under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 23(b)(1) and (b)(2), where no opt-outs are permitted, and mass tort cases,
where problems such as conflicts between current and future claimants and other
issues unique to the mass tort context present themselves. See supra note 36.
Professional objectors have been noticeably absent from those cases.
75
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(e)(5) requires court approval before an
objection can be withdrawn. In theory, that rule offers a way to call the bluff of
objectors whose objections will ultimately be found groundless. See MANUAL FOR
COMPLEX LITIGATION, supra note 4, §21.643, at 328; Absmeier, supra note 70, at
634. But Rule 23(e)(5) is no panacea. Many judges may not wish to look behind
objections that have effectively been mooted by being withdrawn. Id. That will be
particularly so when the parties represent that the withdrawal was with their
consent. Courts have enough to do in addressing objections that are not withdrawn
and in the larger endeavor of ensuring that settlements are fair, reasonable, and
adequate. But see Yeagley v. Wells Fargo & Co., No. C 05-03403 CRB, 2008 WL
171083, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 18, 2008) (rejecting attempt to withdraw objections,
finding that “class counsel simply ‘bought off’ objectors’ counsel” in exchange for
agreement to withdraw objections and noting that approving withdrawal of
objections would “encourage attorneys to interject objections for the sole purpose of
extracting a payment from class counsel”).
76
Great Neck Capital, 212 F.R.D. at 415–16 (fee awarded to objectors who raised
issues that “otherwise would have gone unnoticed”); cf. Woolley, supra note 46, at
603 (arguing that the right to be heard and participate in class action litigation “is
properly conceived as the right to present admissible evidence and make
nonfrivolous legal arguments that otherwise would not be placed before the Court”).
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skeptically. Merely “sharpening the issues” or, even more
amorphously, otherwise “assisting the court” should not earn a
fee.77
Under this standard, certain broad types of objections, no
matter who asserts them, appear to be presumptively invalid or,
at the very least, unworthy of a fee award. All objections by
professional objectors who surface in cases solely to extract a fee
should be treated similarly.
II. PRESUMPTIVELY VALUELESS OBJECTIONS THAT OBJECTORS
AND PROFESSIONAL OBJECTOR COUNSEL OFTEN RAISE
Certain categories of objections appear to be presumptively
useless to judges who are weighing settlement approval. This is
because judges, as fiduciaries for the class,78 are already aware of
the relevant legal principles that objectors might raise, or for
other reasons stated in this Section. Accordingly, these types of
objections should rarely, if ever, be credited and should certainly
not be a basis for a fee award to objector counsel.
A.

Objections to the Form, Content, or Timing of Notice

Rule 23(e)(1) requires that notice of the pendency of a class
action be sent to all class members who would be bound by the
proposed settlement.79
That notice must be given “in a
reasonable manner.”80 The object of the notice is to summarize
the litigation and the settlement, to apprise class members of
their rights to inspect the complete settlement documents, and to
accept the settlement, object to it, or exclude themselves from it.81
There is always a tension between notice being too general
and being so detailed that it cannot be understood.82 It is easy
77

See infra notes 154–57 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 23–31 and accompanying text.
79
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(1). If a class was not already certified in the course of the
litigation but a settlement class is being proposed as part of the settlement, the
notice must also satisfy Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(c)(2) regarding class
certification.
80
Id. 23(e)(1).
81
See, e.g., Rodriguez v. West Publ’g Corp., 563 F.3d 948, 962 (9th Cir. 2009);
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. VISA USA, Inc., 396 F.3d 96, 114 (2d Cir. 2005); In re
Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. Sales Practices Litig., 148 F.3d 283, 326–27 (3d Cir.
1998); Grunin v. Int’l House of Pancakes, 513 F.2d 114, 122 (8th Cir. 1975).
82
See, e.g., DeHoyos v. Allstate Corp., 240 F.R.D. 269, 300 (W.D. Tex. 2007)
(noting that objectors attacked notice as “confusing” while, “in the next breath,”
arguing that notice should have included other information that court found
78
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for an objector either to demand more specificity or to complain
that a notice that contains too much specificity is too complex.83
In fact, there is “a wide range of possible notices, . . . each of
which would strike an appropriate balance between inclusiveness
and brevity.”84
The form and content of the notice is within the discretion of
the trial court and must be approved by that court before it is
issued.85 Thus, objections to notice seek to second-guess the
court, not the class counsel who supposedly need to be kept
honest.
The timing of notice is largely settled. Cases around the
country repeatedly state that thirty to sixty days notice is
sufficient to allow class members to make their decision to accept
the settlement, object, or exclude themselves.86
Professional objectors frequently make the same boilerplate
complaints about notice, such as the oft-repeated, but unrealistic,
contention that notice should tell each class member how much

“complicated and potentially confusing”); In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. Sales
Practices Litig., 962 F. Supp. 450, 528 (D.N.J. 1997) (“On the one hand, the notice
must be readable. . . . And, on the other hand, the parties must be careful to include
the requisite core information.”), aff’d, 148 F.3d 283 (3d Cir. 1998); see also
Thompson v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 216 F.R.D. 55, 68 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (noting that
some objectors challenged notice as omitting certain items, while others complained
that notice “contains too much information and is overly complicated”).
83
There is an almost infinite array of facts or other matters that, arguably,
might be included in a notice. See, e.g., Rodriguez, 563 F.3d at 962 (noting that
objectors demanded that the content of objections be included in notice); Bell Atl.
Corp. v. Bolger, 2 F.3d 1304, 1317 (3d Cir. 1993) (objectors complained that notice
should have included various items); In re Prudential, 962 F. Supp. at 528–33
(noting that objectors cited a dozen different items that allegedly should have been
included in notice); UAW v. Gen. Motors Corp., No. 05-CV-73991-DT, 2006 WL
891151, at *33 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 31, 2006) (“A summary, by its nature, cannot
discuss every term of the [settlement] agreement.”).
84
In re Prudential, 962 F. Supp. at 528; see In re Metro. Life Ins. Co. Sales
Practices Litig., 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22688, at *52 (W.D. Pa. Dec. 28, 1999)
(noting that some objectors demanded more detail while others argued notice was
already too complex “demonstrated that the Class Notice Package strikes a proper
balance and provides sufficient information in as clear and concise a manner as
possible given the nature of the proposed settlement”).
85
For examples of cases applying the abuse of discretion standard to review a
settlement notice, see Int’l Union v. Gen. Motors Corp., 497 F.3d 615, 630 (6th Cir.
2007); Bell Atl. Corp., 2 F.3d at 1317.
86
See, e.g., In re Prudential, 962 F. Supp. at 562 (citing cases); 3 ALBA CONTE &
HERBERT NEWBERG, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 8:37, at 276 (4th ed. 2002). At
least one case held that twelve days notice was sufficient. Armstrong v. Bd. of Sch.
Dirs., 616 F.2d 305, 310 (7th Cir. 1980).
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he or she might receive under the settlement.87 There is virtually
“nothing new under the sun”88 in terms of objections to notice.
Those objections to notice that have been and continue to be
made are virtually all insupportable in the normal case.
That is particularly so now that settlement notices routinely
include a toll-free telephone number for class members to call for
more information and a website that provides more detail about
the settlement and, often, copies of pleadings, settlement papers,
and more.89 Any class member with questions about the notice
can receive answers regardless of the notice's clarity regardless of
how clear the notice is.90 For all these reasons, objections to the
form, content, or timing of notice should be considered
presumptively invalid.91 Objectors often merely cloud the issues
with their attacks on notice.92
87
See, e.g., Rodriguez, 563 F.3d at 962 (finding no reason why notice should
“analyze the expected value [of fully litigating the case]”); Petrovic v. Amoco Oil Co.,
200 F.3d 1140, 1153 (8th Cir. 1999); In re Katrina Canal Breaches Consol. Litig., 263
F.R.D. 340, 360 (E.D. La. 2009); In re Warfarin Sodium Antitrust Litig., 212 F.R.D.
231, 253 (D. Del. 2002), aff’d, 391 F.3d 516 (3d Cir. 2004); Varacallo v. Mass. Mut.
Life Ins. Co., 226 F.R.D. 207, 227 (D.N.J. 2005) (stating that “each Class Member’s
individual circumstances and every contingency could not possibly be summarized in
any Notice”); Thompson v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 216 F.R.D. 55, 67 (S.D.N.Y. 2003);
see also In re Corel Corp. Sec. Litig., 293 F. Supp. 2d 484, 491 (E.D. Pa. 2003)
(finding the objection that notice did not afford class members “enough information
to adequately assess the prospects of litigation” was “without merit”).
88
Ecclesiastes 1:9.
89
In re Warfarin, 212 F.R.D. at 252.
90
See, e.g., Meyenburg v. Exxon Mobil Corp., No. 3:05-cv-15-DGW, 2006 WL
5062697, at *7 (S.D. Ill. June 5, 2006) (finding that the notice need not have included
the entire settlement agreement, particularly where long form notice, release, and
other material was available on website and class members could telephone class
counsel toll-free for answers to questions); Varacallo, 226 F.R.D. at 227.
91
For a rare instance in which the parties simply failed to include in the notice
the items required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(c)(2), leading to the
rejection of that notice, see Larson v. Sprint Nextel Corp., No. 07-5325(JLL), 2009
WL 1228443, at *10–11 (D.N.J. Apr. 30, 2009). Occasionally, objections to the
method of disseminating notice are found valid. See In re Homestore.com, Inc. Sec.
Litig., No. CV01-11115 RSWL(CWX), 2004 WL 2792185, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 10,
2004) (ordering re-noticing of class members on finding that a strong likelihood
existed that a substantial portion of the class would not have received timely notice).
And, of course, if settling parties fail to send individual notice even though such
notice is plainly practicable and reasonable, see FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2)(B) (stating
that notice of class certification, applicable where no litigation class was certified
prior to settlement, must be “the best notice that is practicable under the
circumstances”); id. 23(e)(1) (stating that notice of settlement must be disseminated
“in a reasonable manner”), an objection to the settlement on that basis would
certainly be appropriate. See Larson, 2009 WL 1228443, at *5, *7, *9 (noting that
requirements of Rule 23(c)(2) are “more stringent” than those of Rule 23(e)(1), and
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Objections to Class Counsel Fees

Class counsel fees are a prominent issue in virtually every
settlement. Each Circuit has one or more leading cases on that
subject.93 As a result, courts are already aware of the standards
for fee awards even without submissions from objectors.94 In the
instances in which courts have reduced the fees requested, they
likely would have done so even without objector submissions.95
Moreover, there is a range of reasonableness for attorney
fees.96 Thus an objector can always assert that class counsel
should have received less, making this a fertile argument for
professional objectors. Nonetheless, the trial judge’s award
should be affirmed unless it constitutes an abuse of discretion,
which is an extraordinarily rare occurrence.97 Accordingly,
appellate objections that class counsel received too high a fee are
unlikely to be useful.
Furthermore, encouraging objections to class counsel fees
runs counter to the settled policy of using generous fee awards to
incentivize class counsel to bring risky litigation in the public

holding that individual notice of pendency and settlement is required under Rule
23(c)(2) where less than all, but a “significant amount of [class members] have been
identified” with individual addresses).
92
In re Cardinal Health, Inc. Sec. Litig., 550 F. Supp. 2d 751, 753 (S.D. Ohio
2008).
93
See, e.g., Gunter v. Ridgewood Energy Corp., 223 F.3d 190, 190 (3d Cir. 2001);
Goldberger v. Integrated Res., Inc., 209 F.3d 43, 47 (2d Cir. 2000). For a useful
summary of the approaches of many Circuits to percentage of the fund awards in
particular, see Nilsen v. York Cnty., 400 F. Supp. 2d 266, 273–76 (D. Me. 2005).
94
In re Currency Conversion Fee Antitrust Litig., 263 F.R.D. 110, 129 (S.D.N.Y.
2009); In re Cardinal Health, 550 F. Supp. 2d at 753; In re Qwest Commc’ns Int’l,
Inc. Sec. Litig., No. 01-cv-01451-REB-CBS, 2007 WL 2087536, at *3 (D. Colo. July
17, 2007); Spark v. MBNA Corp., 289 F. Supp. 2d 510, 513 (D. Del. 2003).
95
In re Qwest, 2007 WL 2087536, at *2–3; In re Rent-Way Sec. Litig., 305 F.
Supp. 2d 491, 520 (W.D. Pa. 2003); Gerstein v. Micron Tech., Inc., Civ. No. 89-1262,
1993 WL 735031, at *1 (D. Ida. Jan. 9, 1993); In re Anchor Sec. Litig., CV-88-3024,
1991 WL 53651, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 8, 1991).
96
See, e.g., In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. Sales Practices Litig., 148 F.3d 283,
341 (3d Cir. 1998) (“[M]ultiples ranging from one to four are frequently awarded in
common fund cases when the lodestar method is applied.” (quoting WILLIAM B.
RUBENSTEIN, HERBERT NEWBERG & ALBA CONTE, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS;
§ 14.6, at 17 (3d ed. 1992))); Vizcaino v. Microsoft Corp., 290 F.3d 1043, 1052 (9th
Cir. 2002) (surveying range of percentage awards); In re Gen. Motors Corp. Pick-Up
Truck Fuel Tank Product Liab. Litig., 55 F.3d 768, 822 (3d Cir. 1995) (noting fee
awards range from nineteen to four-five percent).
97
See, e.g., Taubenfeld v. Aon Corp., 415 F.3d 597, 600 (7th Cir. 2005); Gunter,
223 F.3d at 195–96 (applying abuse of discretion standard).
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interest.98 Class counsel normally handle such cases on a
contingent basis, under which they risk not only their time but
often millions of dollars in out of pocket expenses.99 Objectors’
insistence on less than generous fees would kill the goose that
lays the golden egg of recoveries for class members who, by
definition, cannot economically fight for themselves.100
Finally, the duty of courts to protect the class in the
settlement context is already accentuated under Rule 23 in the
area of counsel fees.101 For this reason too, there is no reason to
encourage objections to class counsel fees.102
98

See, e.g., In re Cendant Corp. Sec. Litig., 404 F.3d 173, 193 (3d Cir. 2005)
(recognizing the need for fee structures negotiated under PSLRA to “provid[e]
counsel with incentives to perform excellent work”); Florin v. Nationsbank of Ga., 60
F.3d 1245, 1247 (7th Cir. 1995) (“[T]he court must also be careful to sustain the
incentive for attorneys to continue to represent such clients on an ‘inescapably
contingent’ basis.” (quoting Cont’l Ill. Sec. Litig., 962 F.2d 566, 569 (7th Cir. 1992)));
Jones v. Dominion Res. Servs., Inc., 601 F. Supp. 2d 756, 765 (S.D. W. Va. 2009)
(recognizing public policy in favor of sufficient fees to ensure that competent counsel
will take on “ ‘the often risky and arduous task of representing a class’ ” (quoting In
re Microstrategy, Inc. Sec. Litig, 172 F. Supp. 2d 178, 188 (E.D. Va. 2001)); In re
WorldCom, Inc. Sec. Litig., 388 F. Supp. 2d 319, 359 (S.D.N.Y. 2005); In re Domestic
Air Transp. Antitrust Litig., 148 F.R.D. 297, 306 (N.D. Ga. 1993) (discussing “the
financial incentive necessary to induce experienced and well-qualified counsel to
take on complex and time-consuming cases for the benefit of the public and for which
they may never be paid or even reimbursed for considerable out-of-pocket
expenses”); Coffee, supra note 22, at 398 (referring to undesirability of reducing
economic incentives for class counsel to act as “private attorneys general”).
99
See, e.g., Varacallo v. Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 226 F.R.D. 207, 256 (D.N.J.
2005) (awarding over $2.5 million in expenses); In re NASDAQ Market-Makers
Antitrust Litig., 187 F.R.D. 465, 489–90 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (awarding over $4.4 million
in expenses); In re Domestic Air, 148 F.R.D. at 306 (awarding over $1.6 million in
expenses).
100
This principle derives from the superiority criterion of Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 23(b)(3), which addresses, in subsection (A), “the class members’ interests
in individually controlling the prosecution or defense of separate actions,” as opposed
to a class action. The superiority criterion weighs in favor of a class action where the
amounts involved are relatively small or where there are other reasons why class
members would not pursue individual actions against the defendant. See, e.g.,
Smilow v. Sw. Bell Mobile Sys., Inc., 323 F.3d 32, 41–42 (1st Cir. 2003). In such
instances, the only way that victims have a chance to recover their losses is if class
counsel are willing to take the risk of contingent class action litigation, which
requires potential fees sufficient to entice them to take that extraordinary risk.
101
See supra notes 29–31 and accompanying text.
102
Courts have reduced fee requests even when no objector has challenged them.
See, e.g., Fischel v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc’y, 307 F.3d 997, 1007–08 (9th Cir.
2002); Munoz v. UPS Ground Freight, Inc., No. C 07-00970 MHP, 2009 WL 1626376,
at *3–5 (N.D. Cal. June 9, 2009); Gribble v. Cool Transports, Inc., No. CV 06-04863
GAF (SHx), 2008 WL 5281665, at *11–12 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 15, 2008); In re Top
Tankers Sec. Litig., No. 06 Civ. 13761(CM), 2008 WL 2944620, at *17 (S.D.N.Y. July
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Professional objectors who object to fees ultimately wish to
claim much of the “savings” for themselves.103 They are far from
disinterested advocates seeking to protect the class.
Fee
objections from pro se class members are problematic for a
different reason: they are usually unsupported by applicable
attorney fees caselaw principles. Instead, they are often based
on: (1) misplaced comparisons between the amount of class
members’ individual recoveries and class counsel’s aggregate fee,
which is often a percentage of the total classwide settlement; or
(2) bald assertions that the attorneys are getting too much or
that class actions are worthless to the class and benefit only the
lawyers.104 Perhaps the only valid objections to fees may come
from state pension funds or other institutional clients whose
counsel are not seeking a piece of the fee for themselves.105
As a policy matter, objections to class counsel fees, even if
valid and based on considerations that the court would not
otherwise perceive, do not produce enough benefits to the class to
justify the disincentive that such objections pose to enticing
counsel to take on risky class action matters. If a fee is reduced
and the difference goes back to the defendants, the class obtains
no benefit at all. Even where the reduction in the fee goes to the
class, the amounts involved are so small that the benefit to the
class is de minimis.106 But fee reductions—except in the rare
case in which class counsel seek a fee that is outside the range of
reasonableness—have the effect of discouraging attorneys from
risking their time and incurring the substantial expense of
handling these purely contingent cases.107 Particularly since
31, 2008); In re Renaissancere Holdings Ltd. Sec. Litig., No. 05 Civ. 6764(WHP),
2008 WL 236684, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 18, 2008); Silberblatt v. Morgan Stanley, 524
F. Supp. 2d 425, 433 (S.D.N.Y. 2007); Nienaber v. Citibank, N.A., CIV No. 04-4054,
2007 WL 2003761, at *5 (D.S.D. July 5, 2007); see also, e.g., Sutton v. Bernard, 504
F.3d 688, 694 (7th Cir. 2007) (holding the district court incorrectly reduced the fee
that no one had objected to and reversing and remanding because the district court
based its fee reduction on the “degree of success”); Gunter, 223 F.3d at 192.
103
See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
104
See, e.g., In re Xcel Energy Sec., Deriv. & ERISA Litig., 364 F. Supp. 2d 980,
997–98 (D. Minn. 2005); Varacallo, 226 F.R.D. at 252; In re Domestic Air, 148 F.R.D.
at 306.
105
See In re Cardinal Health, Inc. Sec. Litig., 550 F. Supp. 2d 751, 753 (S.D.
Ohio 2008) (reducing class counsel fee based on objections by state pension funds).
106
In re AT&T Corp. Sec. Litig., 455 F.3d 160, 168 (3d Cir. 2006) (noting this de
minimis effect, though in a different context).
107
See supra notes 98–100 and accompanying text; see also Brunet, supra note
7, at 431–32.
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judges are already acutely aware of the governing standards, fee
objections should be discouraged, and objectors who make them
should not be compensated even if the class counsel fee is
reduced.
Recognizing that the amount of the class counsel fee is
within the court’s broad discretion, professional objector counsel
frequently demand that all or part of that fee be withheld until
the settlement claims and distribution process is complete.108
Objector counsel then seek a fee based on this “benefit” to the
class. This objection plays on the surface appeal of the notion
that class counsel should not be compensated until class
members receive their settlement benefits. However, class
counsel are already under a fiduciary duty to represent the class
zealously until the end. Especially when the class counsel have a
track record of excellent performance, there is no need to “stage”
their fees to ensure that they continue to represent the class
properly.109 Class counsel have a right to prompt payment after
their long years of fighting for the class without compensation.110
Prompt payment is necessary to encourage class counsel to take
on such risky cases.111
C.

Objections to Class Certification by a Class Member Who,
Absent Class Certification, Would Recover Nothing from the
Defendant

A court must find that a proposed settlement class satisfies
the requirements of Rule 23 in addition to determining that the
settlement itself is fair, reasonable, and adequate.112 Among the

108
Many cases reject this argument, see, for example, In re AT&T, 455 F.3d at
174–75; Varacallo, 226 F.R.D. at 251–52. But see Perez v. Asurion Corp., No. 0620734-CIV, 2007 WL 2591180, at *8 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 8, 2007) (ordering that nearly
thirty-three percent of fee was to be escrowed until ten days after defendants
certified to provision of settlement relief, in accordance with court’s “practice in most
class actions,” having nothing to do with objectors’ advocacy).
109
See In re AT&T, 455 F.3d at 174–75 (finding “no indication [that] class
counsel would stop working diligently on behalf of the class”); In re Prudential Ins.
Co. of Am. Sales Practices Litig., 106 F. Supp. 2d 721, 734 (D.N.J. 2000) (noting that
“[e]ven in the time since the settlement in this matter was finally approved, Class
Counsel have continued to remain actively involved in the matter”).
110
See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
111
For a discussion of the need for incentives to induce counsel to handle risky
class action matters, see supra notes 98–100 and accompanying text.
112
In re Gen. Motors Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank Prod. Liab. Litig., 55 F.3d 768,
794–97 (3d Cir. 1995). An exception to that principle is that, since the proposal is
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most cynical objections are those made to certification of a class
by a settlement class member who could not recover anything
from the defendant if the settlement were disapproved. Such
objections occur when that class member has not filed his or her
own lawsuit, and when there is no competing class action,
perhaps with a different class definition, to afford potential
relief.113 As a result, if the settlement fails due to a supposed
impropriety in certifying a settlement class or otherwise, the
class member would have no chance of recovery at all.
Objections by class members that would not recover if
settlement were not approved are a frequent stratagem of
professional objectors, who often find it easier to attack abstract
class certification criteria than to understand the details of the
settlement or the particular underlying facts of the case.114
Counsel use these objections to try to obtain a fee for themselves,
but the objections, if successful, are actually to the detriment of
their clients, who will get nothing if the settlement fails. If a
class member does not like a settlement or the proposed
settlement class, he or she should exercise the right to be
excluded from that settlement.115 Objector counsel do not advise
that there be no trial, the superiority prong of Rule 23(b)(3) need not be satisfied by
a settlement class. Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 619 (1997).
113
In contrast, where there is another pending putative class action, an
objection to class certification is not facially absurd. See, e.g., In re Prudential Ins.
Co. of Am. Sales Practices Litig., 148 F.3d 283, 313 (3d Cir. 1998) (noting that
objector Krell contended that his own putative statewide class action, involving only
certain of the claims encompassed in the nationwide class action, would have
afforded more relief as to those claims than did the nationwide class action to which
he objected).
114
For examples of this phenomenon, see In re Ins. Brokerage Antitrust Litig.,
Nos. 04-5184(GEB), 05-1079(GEB), 2007 WL 2589950, at *13–15 (D.N.J. Sept. 4,
2007) (noting that objector Van Enterprises opposed class certification but had not
filed its own case), aff’d, 579 F.3d 241 (3d Cir. 2009); Varacallo v. Mass. Mut. Life
Ins. Co., 226 F.R.D. 207, 229, 232 (D.N.J. 2005) (noting an objection to class
certification by objector Wolfson, who had not filed her own case). In In re Insurance
Brokerage, the Third Circuit found it “peculiar that [the Van Enterprise objectors’]
interests [were] so closely aligned with the non-settling defendants” but nonetheless
accepted those arguments at face value. 579 F.3d at 261 n.21.
115
Federal Rule Civil Procedure 23(c)(2)(B) affords a right to exclusion that
applies to settlement classes as well as litigation classes. Rule 23(e)(3) may give
members of an already certified litigation class a second opportunity to exclude
themselves when the case is settled. These opt-out rights, however, are available
only in monetary damage cases under Rule 23(b)(3). The discussion in the text is
limited to such cases. Professional objectors rarely surface in cases not falling under
Rule 23(b)(3), since such cases generally do not generate a fund from which class
counsel, and, derivatively, objector counsel, can seek a fee.
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their clients to exclude themselves because they would then lack
standing to object to the settlement, thus depriving objector
counsel of their potential payday.116 Courts should see through
this stratagem and reject such objections out of hand.
D. Objections That Supposedly “Improve the Settlement” at the
Margins
Objectors
whose
objections
result
in
substantial
improvements of the proposed settlement can get attorney fees,
whether a percentage of the value of the improvement or
otherwise.117 However, courts have awarded fees to objectors who
proposed only more marginal improvements to settlements.118
Since, by definition, a settlement is never the optimal result for
the plaintiffs,119 there is always room for an objector to demand
more and then, if the parties acquiesce, to seek a fee.
Courts routinely state that they will not second-guess the
views of class and defense counsel who have lived the case if the
settlement presented by the parties is within the range of
reasonableness.120 Objector counsel should not be able to do so
either.
Once again, the delays in the provision of the agreed-upon
relief to the class and the other negatives that objectors present
outweigh any marginal benefits that their objections may
occasionally produce for the class. A settlement that falls within
the range of reasonableness is approvable and should be
approved.
Only very rarely is an objector’s proposed
improvement substantial. Even more infrequently does it lift a
proposed settlement that is below the range of reasonableness

116
See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(5) (“Any class member may object to the
propos[ed settlement] if it requires court approval under this subdivision (e) . . . .”
(emphasis added)); Gould v. Alleco, Inc., 883 F.2d 281, 284 (4th Cir. 1989).
117
See infra notes 154–56, 160 and accompanying text.
118
See infra notes 157–59 and accompanying text.
119
See In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. Sales Practices Litig., 148 F.3d 283, 317
(3d Cir. 1998) (“[A]fter all, settlement is a compromise, a yielding of the highest
hopes in exchange for certainty and resolution.”); Thompson v. Metro. Life Ins. Co.,
216 F.R.D. 55, 65 (S.D.N.Y 2003) (stating that a settlement is not a “wish-list of
class members that the Defendant must fulfill”).
120
See, e.g., Ass’n for Disabled Ams., Inc. v. Amoco Oil Co., 211 F.R.D. 457, 467
(S.D. Fla. 2002); In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. Sales Practices Litig., 962 F. Supp.
450, 543 (D.N.J. 1997), aff’d, 148 F.3d 283 (3d Cir. 1998).
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into the reasonable range.121 Those are the only circumstances in
which an objection that seeks to “improve the settlement” should
even be considered.
E.

Objections to Securities Fraud Settlements in Which
Institutional Investors Have Served as Lead Plaintiff

Securities fraud cases under the Private Securities Litigation
Reform Act122 afford class members yet another layer of
protection beyond that provided by the inherent obligations of
the class counsel and the fiduciary duty of the court.123 The
PSLRA requires that the court appoint as lead plaintiff the
member or members of the putative class whom the court
“determines to be most capable of adequately representing the
interests of class members.”124 The court-appointed lead plaintiff
is then to select class counsel, but that choice must be approved
by the court.125
Congress’s goal in adopting the PSLRA was to place control
of securities fraud class actions in the hands of large institutional
lead plaintiffs, rather than small investors, whom Congress
perceived were controlled by their attorneys.126 Institutional
investors were viewed as more sophisticated and more
independent and therefore more able to protect the interests of
the class, including, when necessary, standing up to class counsel
who might accept a settlement that falls short of the range of

121
The more common case is that the “improvement” arguably affords a
relatively small additional benefit to the class. However, the class, class counsel, and
defendants all have an incentive to adopt the objector’s “improvement” to make the
objector go away and permit the settlement to proceed to approval. See supra notes
57–60, 70 and accompanying text. But that is no basis to take a portion of class
counsel’s hard-earned fee and give it to opportunistic objector counsel. See also infra
notes 157–61 and accompanying text. At most, objector counsel might justifiably be
awarded a lodestar-based fee payable by the defendant.
122
15 U.S.C. § 78u-4 (2006).
123
For discussion of those obligations and duties, see supra notes 14–31 and
accompanying text.
124
15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(3)(B).
125
See id. § 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(v).
126
See, e.g., In re Network Assocs., Inc. Sec. Litig., 76 F. Supp. 2d 1017, 1020
(N.D. Cal. 1999); Gluck v. Cellstar Corp., 976 F. Supp. 542, 548 (N.D. Tex. 1997)
(“[T]hrough the PSLRA, Congress has unequivocally expressed its preference for
securities fraud litigation to be directed by large institutional investors.”); see also
H.R. REP. NO. 104-369, at 34 (1995) (Conf. Rep.) (“The Conference Committee seeks
to increase the likelihood that institutional investors will serve as lead
plaintiffs . . . .”); S. REP. NO. 104-98, at 11 (1995) (Conf. Rep.).
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reasonableness due to counsel’s own concerns.127 Congress’s
objective has been realized in many, if not most, securities fraud
class actions, as state pension funds and other large institutions
have stepped forward to claim the mantle of lead plaintiff.128
In at least two recent cases, institutional lead plaintiffs have
taken securities fraud cases to trial, resulting in one jury verdict
for the defense and the other verdict for the plaintiffs.129 The
sophistication and independence of institutional lead plaintiffs
offers substantial guarantees that they will not enter into an
inadequate settlement. Objections to settlements reached by
such lead plaintiffs should therefore be considered presumptively
unpersuasive.
F.

Objections by Professional Objectors

Professional objectors find a way to object to any substantial
settlement that offers a large fee, seeking a piece for
themselves.130 But their objections are almost invariably
frivolous. For example, the objections of one professional objector,
E.F.S., have been rejected repeatedly by courts around the
127

See, e.g., Sherleigh Assocs. LLC v. Windmere-Durable Holdings, Inc., 184
F.R.D. 688, 691 (S.D. Fla. 1999) (stating that the holder of “largest financial stake
can best prosecute the claims” and “is presumed best able to negotiate with and
oversee counsel”); H.R. REP. NO. 104-369, at 32, 34 (1995). For the argument that
class counsel are likely to be more risk-averse than their clients, particularly as the
case proceeds further along, see Coffee, supra note 22, at 390–91.
128
See, e.g., Elliot J. Weiss, The Lead Plaintiff Provisions of the PSLRA After a
Decade, or “Look What’s Happened to My Baby”, 61 VAND. L. REV. 543, 551–52
(2008) (noting that, after a slow start, institutional investors have increasingly
sought and obtained roles as lead plaintiff); LAURA E. SIMMONS & ELLEN M. RYAN,
CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, SECURITIES CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENTS: 2008 REVIEW
AND ANALYSIS 11 (2009), available at http://www.cornerstone.com/files/News/
c94cedf0-2a04-4779-840d-5accf866dd4f/Presentation/NewsAttachment/732194ea2f86-40cd-bb7e-5bc7c530dcfe/Cornerstone_Research_Settlements_2008_Analysis.pdf
(stating that institutions served as lead plaintiffs in almost sixty percent of
securities settlements in 2008, and cases involving institutional investors,
particularly public pension plans, as lead plaintiffs are associated with higher
settlement amounts); Stephen J. Choi, Jill E. Fisch & A.C. Pritchard, Do Institutions
Matter? The Impact of the Lead Plaintiff Provisions of the Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act, 83 WASH. U. L.Q. 869, 877–78 (2005).
129
See Ashby Jones, Theory & Practice: JDS Wins Investor Lawsuit, Bucking a
Trend—Firm Goes to Trial Rather Than Settling, WALL ST. J., June 2, 2008, at B4;
see also In re Apollo Group, Inc. Sec. Litig., No. CV-04-2147-PHX-JAT, 2008 WL
3072731 (D. Ariz. Aug. 4, 2008), rev’d, and reinstated jury verdict, In re Apollo
Group, Inc. Sec. Litig., No. 08-16971 (9th Cir. June 23, 2010) (unpublished
memorandum opinion).
130
See supra notes 45–54 and accompanying text.
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country, often accompanied by severe criticism of the arguments
that he made.131 Another professional objector, L.S., who has
touted himself as “nationally and internationally recognized as
an authority on the issue of class action abuse, particularly in the
area of excessive attorneys’ fee awards,”132 has seen one court
determine that his papers were “at best, negligently created and,
at worst, suspiciously manufactured”133 and his objections
rejected out of hand in many other cases.134 Likewise, many
131
The full names of this and other professional objectors are omitted from this
article. Readers interested in the identities of those professional objectors can find
those names in the cited cases. For cases involving E.F.S., see, e.g., In re AT&T
Corp., 455 F.3d 160, 172 n.8 (3d Cir. 2006) (labeling one argument “misleading” and
rejected all arguments); In re Bristol-Myers Squibb Sec. Litig., No. 06-2964, 2007
WL 2153284 (3d Cir. 2007); In re UnitedHealth Group, Inc. PSLRA Litig., 643 F.
Supp. 2d 1107, 1108–09 & n.1 (D. Minn. 2009) (characterizing position of objector
counsel, including E.F.S., as “disingenuous,” “preposterous,” and “laughable,” among
other criticisms); Grays Harbor Adventist Christian Sch. v. Carrier Corp., No. 0505437 RBL, 2008 WL 1901988, at *5 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 24, 2008) (finding that
objection “ignores applicable law”); Browning v. Yahoo! Inc., No. C04-01463 HRL,
2007 WL 4105971 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 16, 2007); Perez v. Asurion Corp., 501 F. Supp. 2d
1360, 1379 (S.D. Fla. 2007) (stating that the court “did not find any of the papers
filed by Objectors’ Counsel to be particularly helpful or to have conferred a benefit on
the Class, as they were generic compilations of well-known case law and lacked
specific application to this case,” but because E.F.S.’s appearance at oral argument
“provided a safety check for the parties and the Court,” he would be reimbursed his
travel expenses and a reasonable hourly rate for time actually spent at settlement
hearing).
132
Shaw v. Toshiba Am. Info. Syst., 91 F. Supp. 2d 942, 974 (E.D. Tex. 2000)
(discussing profiessional objector L.S.).
133
Id. at 975 & n.19 (admonishing L.S. and revoking his admission pro hac vice).
134
See, e.g., UFCW Local 880 Joint Pension Fund v. Newmont Mining Corp., No.
05-cv-01046-MSK-BNB, 2008 WL 4452332, at *4 (D. Colo. Sept. 30, 2008) (stating
that L.S., who appeared pro se in that case, had merely raised same objection as
another, and his objection was “general in nature, largely unsupported by specific
citation to the record or to supporting caselaw,” and “lacking in meaningful
analysis”; denying L.S. the “incentive award” he sought for his participation), aff’d,
352 F. App’x 232 (10th Cir. 2009); In re Enron Corp. Sec., Derivative & ERISA Litig.,
586 F. Supp. 2d 732, 811–17 (S.D. Tex. 2008) (rejecting numerous “picky” objections
to attorney fees based on “no authority”); In re NASDAQ Market-Makers Antitrust
Litig., 187 F.R.D. 465, 479–81 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (noting objections with “no authority”
in support of the objection, “contrary to the law,” and otherwise meritless). In
particular, L.S. often demands the appointment of a “guardian” for the class, despite
his previous recognition, see Shaw, 91 F. Supp. 2d at 974–75, and the applicable law
stating, see supra notes 23–31 and accompanying text, that the court is already the
guardian of the class. Courts have repeatedly and emphatically refused to accept
L.S.’s demand for a “guardian.” See, e.g., In re Enron, 586 F. Supp. 2d at 811–12; In
re NASDAQ, 187 F.R.D. at 481; In re Intelligent Electronics Sec. Litig., No. 92-CV1905, 1997 WL 786984, at *10 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 26, 1997); see also Weissman v. Quail
Lodge, Inc., 179 F.3d 1194, 1196–97 (9th Cir. 1999) (quoting district court finding
that L.S.’s arguments were “groundless, contrived and misplaced” and that his
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courts have rebuffed, often harshly, the objections of another
serial objector, E.C.135
Professional objectors often make the same objections in case
after case.136 Courts frequently note that these counsel do not
even understand the settlement to which they object.137 Some
decisions have even sanctioned or harshly criticized the conduct
of professional objectors.138 Serial objector counsel often make
participation in the case “reflects a serious lack of professionalism and good
judgment” and refuing to disturb those conclusions, but vacating a “vexatious
litigant” order that forbade him from filing objections to other class action
settlements).
135
See, e.g., In re Warfarin Sodium Antitrust Litig., 391 F.3d 516, 538 (3d Cir.
2004) (finding that E.C.’s objection was made “without the support of expert
evaluation, citation, or discovery”); In re UnitedHealth Group, Inc. PSLRA Litig.,
643 F. Supp. 2d 1107, 1108–09 (D. Minn. 2009) (condemning objection in colorful
language); Azizian v. Federated Dep’t Stores, Inc., No. C-03-3359 SBA, 2006 WL
4037549, at *9 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 29, 2006) (finding that objections by E.C. and other
“Coordinated Objectors” made no material contribution); In re Relafen Antitrust
Litig., 231 F.R.D. 52, 80 n.21 (D. Mass. 2005) (finding that objection was
contradicted by the record); Varacallo v. Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 226 F.R.D. 207,
246 (D.N.J. 2005) (finding that objector had “fail[ed] to substantiate [his] argument
with anything more than speculation and one [groundless] example”); Clark v.
Experian Info. Solutions, Inc., No. 8:00-1217-22, 2004 WL 256433 (D.S.C. Jan. 14,
2004); In re VisaCheck Money Master Litig., 297 F. Supp. 2d 503 (E.D.N.Y. 2003).
136
For example, serial objector counsel K.N. routinely demands that class
counsel’s fee be paid in installments rather than all at once. That objection fails
again and again, see, e.g., In re AT&T, 455 F.3d at 174; Perez, 2007 WL 2591174, at
*1; Varacallo, 226 F.R.D. at 251–52, but there is nothing to keep him and others who
parrot that argumen from raising it again in another case in hopes of generating a
fee.
137
Serial objector counsel J.P. has been the subject of a series of opinions finding
his objections groundless and stating that he simply did not understand the
settlements to which he objected. See, e.g., In re MetLife Demutualization Litig., 689
F. Supp. 2d 297, 350–51 (E.D.N.Y. 2010) (labeling J.P.’s objections “meritless” and
“based in part upon [a] misconception”); In re Compact Disc Minimum Advertised
Price Antitrust Litig., No. MDL 1361, 2003 WL 22417252, at *2 & n.3 (D. Me. Oct. 7,
2003) (finding that J.P., a “repeat objector,” had filed a “groundless objection,”
imposing an appeal bond because his appeal “might be frivolous,” and noting that
sanctions on appeal were “a real possibility”); In re Warfarin Sodium Antitrust
Litig., 212 F.R.D. 231, 258 (D. Del. 2002), aff’d, 391 F.3d 516 (3d Cir. 2004)
(approving settlement despite objection and finding that J.P., and other serial
objector counsel, had misunderstood allocation and distribution plan); Tenuto v.
Transworld Sys., Inc., No. 99-4228, 2002 WL 188569, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 31, 2002)
(approving settlement and finding that J.P. had been unaware of applicable law and
had misstated value of settlement).
138
See, e.g., Mirfasihi v. Fleet Mortgage Corp., 551 F.3d 682, 687 (7th Cir. 2008),
cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 2767 (2009) (objector attorney fees had been “cut it in half as
a sanction for their irresponsible litigation tactics”); In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am.
Sales Practices Litig., 278 F.3d 175, 193 (3d Cir. 2002) (affirming in part sanctions
against objector counsel); Turner v. Murphy Oil USA, Inc., 582 F. Supp. 2d 797, 806
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arguments that are obviously unsupported by the record.139 To
add insult to injury, these slipshod objections are frequently
submitted late.140
Current law does not require courts to ask whether objectors
or their counsel have a track record of groundless objections.
Proponents of the settlement are left to ferret out and inform the
court of the unsavory histories of serial objectors and their
professional objector counsel.
Objectors and their counsel
purport to be acting in the best interest of the entire class. They
do so in opposition to the court-appointed attorneys for that class,
who must demonstrate their adequacy.141
In light of the prevelance of serial objectors and the problems
they cause, objectors and their counsel should be required to
prove their own adequacy by submitting a list of cases in which
they have represented objectors to class action settlements, what
objections were raised, and what the results of those cases
were.142 This requirement would place objector counsel in a
n.32 (E.D. La. Oct. 6, 2008) (offending paper filed by objector withdrawn after
sanctions motion filed); Perez, 2007 WL 2591174, at *1 n.1 (criticizing tone of
submissions by professional objector counsel as “unprofessional and antagonistic,”
which court found “unproductive and unacceptable”); Shaw, 91 F. Supp. 2d at 975
(revoking pro hac vice admission of objector counsel after noting that counsel had
“submitted documents to [the] Court which [were], at best, negligently created and,
at worst, suspiciously manufactured”).
139
Such cases have been cited throughout this Article. In addition, see, for
example Mirfasihi, 551 F.3d at 687 (citing “the many inaccurate and misleading
statements in [objectors’] briefs and post-argument submission”); In re Cendant
Corp. Litig., 264 F.3d 201, 233 n.18, 235, 236, 238 n.20 (3d Cir. 2001) (rejecting
numerous objections by group of objector counsel as such objections were
“undermined by the evidence in the record,” were “purely speculative,” and based on
“conjecture”); In re AOL Time Warner, Inc., No. MDL 1500, 02 Civ. 5575(SWK), 2006
WL 903236, at *18 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 6, 2006) (rebuffing objection as “conclusory”).
140
See, e.g., In re Holocaust Victim Assets Litig., 311 F. Supp. 2d 363, 371
(E.D.N.Y. 2004) (noting individual objector’s input was “belated”), aff’d, 424 F.3d 150
(2d Cir. 2005); In re UnitedHealth Group, Inc. PSLRA Litig., 643 F. Supp. 2d 1107,
1109 & n.1 (D. Minn. 2009) (noting objectors filed two weeks late); Varacallo, 226
F.R.D. at 245–46; In re Lorazepam & Chlorazepate Antitrust Litig., 205 F.R.D. 369,
404 (D.D.C. 2002); cf. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. VISA USA, Inc., 396 F.3d 96, 124 n.29
(2d Cir. 2005) (noting that objector’s challenge to class counsel fees was not raised
below and therefore would not be considered).
141
See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(3), (g)(1)(B).
142
The results of such a required disclosure may be illuminating. Some objector
counsel have repeatedly represented the same purported client, who sometimes
shares a last name with objector counsel. See, e.g., In re MetLife Demutualization
Litig., 689 F. Supp. 2d 297, 327 (E.D.N.Y. 2010) (noting that objector counsel J.P.
represented J.P., Jr.); In re Ins. Brokerage Antitrust Litig., No. 04-5184, 2009 WL
411856, at *1 (D.N.J. Feb. 17, 2009) (noting that J.P. represented objector Connie P.
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comparable situation to that of attorneys seeking appointment as
class counsel, who routinely submit firm resumes or declarations
detailing their class action experience and results achieved.143
Objections by professional objectors who have a proven track
record of groundless or boilerplate objections, or both, should be
presumptively invalid.144 There is certainly no due process or

Realty Company); Meyenburg v. Exxon Mobil Corp., No. 3:05-cv-15-DGW, 2006 WL
5062697, at *7 (S.D. Ill. June 5, 2006) (J.P. represented objector David P.); In re
Serzone Products Liab. Litig., 231 F.R.D. 221, 228 n.9 (S.D. W. Va. 2005) (J.P. again
represented David P.)); In re Bristol-Myers Squibb Sec. Litig., No. 06-2964, 2007 WL
2153284, at *1 (3d Cir. July 27, 2007) (noting that objector counsel E.F.S.
represented objector Rita Carfagna); Perez v. Asurion Corp., 501 F. Supp. 2d 1360,
1378 (S.D. Fla. 2007) (E.F.S. again represented Ms. Carfagna). The PSLRA was
enacted, in part, to foreclose class counsel from maintaining a stable of class action
plaintiffs who could instantly file suits that Congress viewed as questionable. See,
e.g., 141 CONG. REC. S9074 (daily ed. June 26, 1995) (Sen. Hatch) (“Often, the firms
[involved in perceived strike suits] use the same professional plaintiffs in multiple
suits.”). The judicial system has the same interest in ensuring that serial objectors
do not generate questionable objections to class action settlements that, if approved,
would benefit thousands of persons. Moreover, courts have declined to appoint as
class counsel an attorney who is closely related to the named plaintiff. [cases cited].
Objector counsel should not be treated better than class counsel would be in this
regard. See, e.g., Zylstra v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 578 F.2d 102, 104 (5th Cir. 1978)
(noting that class counsel was married to representative plaintiff); Susman v.
Lincoln Am. Corp., 561 F.2d 86, 90 & n.6 (7th Cir. 1977) (noting that class counsel
was named representative’s brother); Zlotnick v. TIE Commc’ns, Inc., 123 F.R.D.
189, 193–94 (E.D. Pa. 1988) (noting that class counsel was representative plaintiff’s
son). Objector counsel should not be treated better than class counsel would be in
this regard.
143
See, e.g., DeHoyos v. Allstate Corp., 240 F.R.D. 269, 282 (W.D. Tex. 2007);
Varacallo, 226 F.R.D. at 233.
144
In addition to the cases cited supra note 137, J.P., for example, has seen his
objections rebuffed in many other decisions. See, e.g., Taubenfeld v. AON Corp., 415
F.3d 597, 600 (7th Cir. 2005) (noting that objections had been waived in district
court and that objection to expense award “barely warrant[ed] comment”); In re
Initial Pub. Offering Sec. Litig., 671 F. Supp. 2d 467, 497 & n.219 (S.D.N.Y. 2009)
(citing other cases in which courts labeled J.P.’s objections “counterproductive” and
“not well reasoned” (quoting In re Royal Ahold N.V. Sec. & ERISA Litig., 461 F.
Supp. 2d 383, 386 (D. Md. 2006); Taubenfeld, 415 F.3d at 599)); Park v. Thomson
Corp., 633 F. Supp. 2d 8, 12–13 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 2, 2009); In re AOL Time Warner
ERISA Litig., No. 02 Cv. 8853(SWK), 2007 WL 4225486, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 28,
2007) (finding that “several arguments” were “irrelevant or simply incorrect”);
Azizian v. Federated Dep’t Stores, Inc., No. C-03-3359 SBA, 2006 WL 4037549 (N.D.
Cal. Sept. 29, 2006); Spark v. MBNA Corp., 289 F. Supp. 2d 510, 513–14 (D. Del.
2003). K.N., see supra note 136, has appeared in numerous insurance sales practices
cases, often with the same objections, and has been repeatedly rebuffed. See, e.g.,
Benacquisto v. Am. Express Fin. Corp., No. 00-1980 (DSD/JMM), 2001 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 23914 (D. Minn. May 15, 2001); Michels v. Phoenix Home Life Mut. Ins. Co.,
No. 95/53181997 WL 1161145, at *5 & n.1 (Sup. Ct. Albany Cnty. Jan. 3, 1997).
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other valid objection to treating objector counsel like class
counsel in this regard.145
Among other things, this requirement would shed light on
the validity of the time allegedly incurred by objector counsel. If
the same counsel made the same objection in prior cases, then
little or no original work was required in the case at issue. That
absence of real effort should affect the fee award, if any, that
could be made to objector counsel.
Likewise, objecting class members themselves should
provide a list of prior cases in which they have objected to
settlements. Such a requirement would to some extent parallel
the mandate of the PSLRA that proposed lead plaintiffs identify
other actions in which they have served as representative
plaintiffs.146 Objections by clients who make a habit of asserting
baseless objections to class action settlements should also be
deemed presumptively invalid.
Courts should even consider requiring objectors to submit to
depositions by the settling parties, either in every case in which
the settling parties wish to take such depositions or in particular
circumstances only. Class representatives are normally deposed
before class certification. Such questioning can bring to light
how those representatives found their counsel and other facts
that defendants believe might show that the putative
representatives are not adequate.147 The settling parties often
may have reason to believe that objectors have been recruited by
professional objector counsel, primarily to serve counsel’s

145
At least one case imposed this requirement and rejected objectors’ arguments
that it was unfair. DeHoyos, 240 F.R.D. at 316.
146
15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(2)(A)(v) (2006). A person may be a lead plaintiff in no
more than five cases within three years absent leave of court. Id. § 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(vi).
147
See, e.g., In re Monster Worldwide, Inc. Sec. Litig., 251 F.R.D. 132, 135–36
(S.D.N.Y. 2008); Burkhalter Travel Agency v. MacFarms Intern., Inc., 141 F.R.D.
144, 154 (N.D. Cal. 1991).
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interests, rather than the other way around.148 Depositions of
objectors may expose that fact, just as a deposition of a class
representative may reveal inadequacy.149
III. THE NEED TO TIGHTEN THE STANDARDS FOR FEE AWARDS TO
OBJECTOR COUNSEL
In addition to viewing more skeptically the objections
presented by serial objector counsel, courts should tighten the
standards for awarding fees to objector counsel.150 Though the
148
See, e.g., Vollmer v. Publishers Clearing House, 248 F.3d 698, 705 (7th Cir.
2001) (affirming denial of intervention but reversing sanctions against objector
counsel where the district judge both denied intervention to objector and imposed
sanctions on his professional objector counse and stating “that the attorneys
recruited [their objector client] to intervene so that they could extract a fee from the
proceedings”).
149
For an excerpt of a deposition of a “know-nothing class representative,” see
Linda S. Mullenix, Resolving Aggregate Mass Tort Litigation: The New Private Law
Dispute Resolution Paradigm, 33 VAL. U. L. REV. 413, 437–38 (1999). Professor
Mullenix asserts that the presence of such class representatives is “pervasive.” Id. at
437. Whether or not that is so, objector clients are likely often utterly ignorant of the
case and their role in it but are instead merely a convenient tool for the interests of
professional objector counsel. See, e.g., supra notes 112–16 and accompanying text
(discussing objections to class certification that go against the interest of objecting
clients themselves).
150
The arguments in this section relate, of course, only to objector counsel who
appear on a contingent fee basis. Objector counsel whose clients have agreed to pay
them on a different basis would be subject only to the normal rules that govern
attorney fees. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.5 (2010).
Noncontingent fees should be encouraged in the objector context, as they are the
most rational and fair arrangement in many ways. Indeed, in some jurisdictions,
objector counsel may be required to offer clients “an arrangement for compensation
on the basis of the reasonable value of the services” before entering into a contingent
arrangement. See, e.g., N.J. CT. R. 1:21-7(b) (2010). First, an hourly or flat fee
arrangement would resolve the conundrum identified by prominent scholars: Under
the contingent fee regime, objector counsel are rewarded with a fee if they “improve”
an inadequate settlement but not if they defeat it altogether. See, e.g., Coffee, supra
note 22, at 423; Koniak & Cohen, supra note 43, at 1107 n.184. Second, replacing
contingent fees with an alternative regime avoids the problem of disincentivizing
class counsel by requiring them to share their fee with objector counsel, while still
ensuring that objector counsel are paid. See supra notes 98–100 and accompanying
text. Third, particularly given the relatively limited scope of most objector legal
work, which begins only after a settlement is reached and largely involves only the
review of others’ efforts, it would be expected that an objector client who really
believes that a settlement is unfair, unreasonable, or inadequate would find it in his
or her economic interest to pay an appropriate, relatively small hourly or flat fee for
counsel to vindicate that position. Objectors who must pay their counsel will
consider whether it is objectively worthwhile to object, thereby reducing the number
of groundless objections or those motivated by motives of extortion. In contrast,
objectors who retain counsel on a contingent fee basis have no reason to evaluate
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general principles of current law permit objector fee awards only
in limited circumstances, enough exceptions have been made that
serial objectors believe that they can earn a living by
undermining class action settlements. The courts should return
to the strict rules that severely limit fee awards to objector
counsel to cases in which their objections substantially benefit
the class.
Fee awards to class action objectors are “few and far
between.”151 The general rule is that objectors are not entitled to
fees.152 At least one case refers to this as a “presumption.”153
Objectors are to be awarded fees only when they have “expended
large amounts of time, money and resources, aided the court
considerably in its consideration of proposed settlements and fee
awards, and the class members were ultimately benefited as a
result of the objectors’ efforts.”154 Even objector counsel whose
whether an objection is rational, since they literally make no investment, financial
or otherwise, in objecting and are thus indifferent to whether they are merely being
used as the tools of professional objector counsel. Fourth, the decision of counsel to
represent an objector will likewise be based on proper economic considerations
rather than the potential to extort a portion of class counsel’s fees. It is not unheard
of for objector counsel to act on a basis other than contingency. At oral argument in
the Third Circuit on an objector appeal from the settlement approval in In re
Insurance Brokerage Antitrust Litigation, No. 04-5184(GEB), 2007 WL 2589950
(D.N.J. Sept. 4, 2007), appellate counsel for the objector told the court that he was
working on an hourly basis. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 76, In re Ins.
Brokerage Antitrust Litig., 2007 WL 2589950.
151
Spark v. MBNA Corp., 289 F. Supp. 2d 510, 513 (D. Del. 2003).
152
In re Rent-Way Sec. Litig., 305 F. Supp. 2d 491, 520 (W.D. Pa. 2003); In re
Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. Sales Practices Litig., 273 F. Supp. 2d 563, 565 (D.N.J.
2003).
153
Martin v. Foster Wheeler Energy Corp., No. 3:06-CV-0878, 2008 WL 906472,
at *10 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 31, 2008).
154
Spark, 289 F. Supp. 2d at 513 (citing In re Harnischfeger Indust., Inc. Sec.
Litig., 212 F.R.D. 400, 413–15 (E.D. Wis. 2002); In re Horizon/CMS Healthcare Corp.
Sec. Litig., 3 F. Supp. 2d 1208, 1214 (D.N.M. 1998)); see, e.g., Prudential, 273 F.
Supp. 2d at 571 (noting that a fee was awarded to objector counsel who added
significant value even though “much of [that counsel’s] time was foolishly spent on
parochial matters that did little to advance the progress of the litigation”); Shaw v.
Toshiba Am. Info. Syst., 91 F. Supp. 2d 942, 974 (E.D. Tex. 2000) (noting that fees
were awarded to certain objectors who conferred substantial benefit on class in the
form of an extension of time to redeem coupons); Henry v. Sears Roebuck & Co., No.
98-C-4110, 1999 WL 33526864, at *1 (N.D. Ill. July 23, 1999) (awarding attorney
fees, with consent of class counsel, for over 590 hours spent by objector who added
three features to settlement, which according to plaintiffs’ experts were “very
advantageous” to class,). Cases such as In re Riverstone Networks, Inc., 256 F. App’x
168 (9th Cir. 2007), which awarded fees even while finding that the objector “raised
objections similar to those already raised by another objector,” id. at 170, should not
be followed.
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efforts substantially benefit only a portion of the class can earn a
fee.155 However, objector counsel should be required to submit
specific proofs showing that their efforts substantially benefited
the class and that the benefit would not have been achieved
without their efforts.156
More troubling, however, are awards to objectors who have
not succeeded but merely “sharp[end the] focus” of the court by
“transform[ing] the settlement hearing into a truly adversary
proceeding.”157 Sharpening the focus or creating an adversarial
atmosphere, separately or together, should never be a basis for a
fee award.158
Those largely intangible and amorphous

155
See, e.g., In re Visa Check/Master Money Antitrust Litig., No. CV-96-5238,
2005 WL 2077286, at *13, *17 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 25, 2005) (awarding fee for causing
addition of Spanish in claims process documents, which benefited only part of class);
Great Neck Capital Appreciation Inv. P’ship, L.P. v. Pricewaterhousecoopers, L.L.P.,
212 F.R.D. 400, 414 (E.D. Wis. 2002) (rejecting argument that entire class must
benefit in order for objector counsel to get a fee award).
156
For examples of cases applying this standard, see In re Cendant Corp. Sec.
Litig., 404 F.3d 173, 200 (3d Cir. 2005); DeHoyos v. Allstate Corp., 240 F.R.D. 269,
337 (W.D. Tex. 2007).
157
Frankenstein v. McCrory Corp., 425 F. Supp. 762, 767 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
Frankenstein was among the first cases to adopt this idea, though the only case that
Frankenstein cited as authority for doing so, City of Detroit v. Grinnell Corp., No. 68
Civ. 4026, 1976 WL 1264 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 21, 1976), expressly did not reach the issue
of objector fees. Id. at *3. The “sharpening” concept appears to retain its greatest
strength in the Second Circuit. See, e.g., In re MetLife Demutualization Litig., 689 F.
Supp. 2d 297, 367–68 (E.D.N.Y. 2010); Park v. Thomson Corp., 633 F. Supp. 2d 8, 11
(S.D.N.Y. 2009); Denney v. Jenkens & Gilchrist, 230 F.R.D. 317, 354 (S.D.N.Y.
2005), aff’d in part, rev’d in part on other grounds sub nom. Denney v. Deutsche
Bank AG, 443 F.3d 253 (2d Cir. 2006); In re Indep. Energy Holdings PLC Sec. Litig.,
2003 WL 22801724, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 24, 2003) (awarding fee to objectors even
though result would have been the same with or without them); see also In re AOL
Time Warner ERISA Litig., No. 02 Cv. 8853(SWK), 2007 WL 4225486, at *2
(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 28, 2007) (listing district court cases in Second Circuit that did or did
not award objector fees merely for creating adversarial atmosphere). However, some
cases elsewhere have also adopted this rationale. See, e.g., In re Domestic Air
Transp. Antitrust Litig., 148 F.R.D. 297, 358 (N.D. Ga. 1993). But see Martin, 2008
WL 906472, at *9–10 (noting that district courts in the Third Circuit do not follow
the district courts in the Second Circuit that have awarded fees for “transforming
the settlement hearing into a truly adversarial proceeding”). In In re Holocaust
Victim Assets Litigation, the Second Circuit rejected an objector’s claim for fees for
“sharpen[ing] the focus of settlement issues and provid[ing] important insights
shaping the settlement.” 424 F.3d 150, 157 (2d Cir. 2005). However, before finding
that the objector had not reached that threshold, the court assumed, arguendo, that
this standard was an accurate statement of the law. Id. To the extent that this
foreshadows a retreat from the “sharpening” idea, it would be the appropriate path
for the law to take.
158
See Martin, 2008 WL 906472, at *9–10.
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considerations do not benefit the class monetarily and are too
easy to find, even in cases where no material sharpening
occurred.159 Creating controversy should never justify a counsel
fee. Only substantial enhancement of the benefits to the class
should give rise to a fee award.160 “Fee awards made on the basis
of insignificant or cosmetic changes in the settlement serve to
condone and encourage improper use of the objection process.”161
In this regard, a comparison of objector counsel with class
counsel is again useful.162 Class counsel are not compensated
merely for raising important issues or creating an adversarial
atmosphere. If they do not create a benefit for the class, they do
not receive a fee. Sometimes class counsel do not get a fee even
when they create such benefits, due to the vagaries of attorney
fees law.163 It should not be easier for objector counsel to earn a
fee than class counsel.164
159

See, e.g., In re Synthroid Marketing Litig., 201 F. Supp. 2d 861, 882–83 (N.D.
Ill. 2002) (denying an objector fee request when the “sharpened” issue was already
“obvious”), aff’d in part, modified in part on other grounds, 325 F.3d 974 (7th Cir.
2003).
160
See Vizcaino v. Microsoft Corp., 290 F.3d 1043, 1051–52 (9th Cir. 2002); In re
Leapfrog Enterprises, Inc. Sec. Litig., No. C-03-05421 RMW, 2008 WL 5000208, at
*3 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 21, 2008) (finding that even though objectors provided “some”
benefit to class, it was not “substantial” and therefore did not warrant fee award); In
re Rent-Way Sec. Litig., 305 F. Supp. 2d 491, 520 (W.D. Pa. 2003); Spark v. MBNA
Corp., 289 F. Supp. 2d 510, 513 (D. Del. 2003); In re Great Neck Capital, 212 F.R.D.
at 415 (awarding fees to objector lawyers who “contributed materially to the
proceeding”); see also Azizian v. Federated Dep’t Stores, Inc., No. C-03-3359 SBA,
2006 WL 4037549, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 29, 2006) (noting that while objectors
“provided some value to the process, they [had] not demonstrated that their
involvement significantly enhanced the settlement”); In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am.
Sales Practices Litig., 273 F. Supp. 2d 563, 572 (D.N.J. 2003) (reducing objector
counsel fee request despite lack of objection to it because, despite “extensive” hours
expended, the benefit to class from objections was “limited”).
161
MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION, supra note 4.
162
See id. (“So long as an objector is acting at least in part on behalf of the class,
it is appropriate to impose on the objector a duty to the class similar to the duty
assumed by a named class representative.”).
163
For example, the United States Supreme Court abolished the “catalyst
doctrine,” under which a plaintiff whose efforts are a catalyst for relief could obtain
fees as a prevailing party under various federal statutes. Buckhannon Bd. & Care
Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep’t of Health & Human Res., 532 U.S. 598, 605 (2001). As a
result, when a defendant “voluntarily” provides relief sought in a class action, while
refusing to enter into a formal settlement, the defendant may be able to defeat a fee
claim. This occurred in Chin v. Daimler-Chrysler Corp., 520 F. Supp. 2d 589 (D.N.J.
2006), rev’d sub nom. Chin v. Chrysler LLC, 538 F.3d 272 (3d Cir. 2008). There, the
district court found that class counsel’s many years of effort led to an extension of
automobile warranties and other relief worth millions of dollars to purchasers and
lessees of Chrysler vehicles. Chin v. Daimler-Chrysler Corp., 461 F. Supp. 2d 279
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Even in the rare circumstances where a fee to objector
counsel could be justified, the fee should be no more than the
objecting counsel’s lodestar, which is defined as the number of
hours multiplied by the attorney’s reasonable rate.165 Unlike
class counsel, who litigate for years while advancing huge
amounts of out-of-pocket costs, objector counsel rarely, if ever,
have real risk.166 Often, they merely parrot arguments raised
more effectively by others167 or offer “suggestions” that the court
(D.N.J. 2006). The district court then awarded class counsel an attorney fee for that
success. Chin, 520 F. Supp. 2d 589. The Third Circuit reversed the fee award on
choice of law grounds. Chin, 538 F.3d 272. Class counsel ended up with no fee at all,
despite having obtained substantial relief for the class.
164
Rule 23(h), which addresses fee awards, makes no distinction between class
counsel and objector counsel in this regard. Rule 23(h) “does not undertake to create
new grounds for an award of attorney fees or nontaxable costs.” FED. R. CIV. P. 23(h)
advisory committee’s note. Thus, the adoption of Rule 23(h) does not alter the
previously enunciated standards for objector attorney fees. See Fleury v. Richemont
North America Inc., No. C-05-4525-EMC, 2008 WL 4829868, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 4,
2008) (finding that Rule 23(h) does not create independent right to objector attorney
fees and that the objector “must find an independent basis in substantive law
authorizing such fees”).
165
In many circumstances, plaintiff’s counsel who succeed in a contingent fee
case can receive more than their lodestar. See, e.g., In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am.
Sales Practice Litig., 148 F.3d 283, 341 (3d Cir. 1998) (stating that multipliers of
between one and four on counsel's lodestar are frequently awarded) (citation
omitted). But see Perdue v. Kenny A., ___ U.S. ___, 130 S. Ct. 1662, 176 L. Ed. 2d
494 (2010) (limiting enhancements that are based on results achieved or quality of
performance).
166
See, e.g., UFCW Local 880 Joint Pension Fund v. Newmont Mining Corp., No.
05-cv-01046-MSK-BNB, 2008 WL 4452332, at *6 (D. Colo. Sept. 30, 2008). Many
courts have refused to award a fee multiplier to objector counsel. See, e.g., In re
Riverstone Networks, Inc., 256 F. App’x 168, 170 (9th Cir. 2007) (denying objector
counsel’s request for fee multiplier because little or no risk incurred); Wininger v. SI
Mgmt., L.P., 301 F.3d 1115, 1126 (9th Cir. 2002); Lonardo v. Travelers Indem. Co.,
706 F. Supp. 2d 766, 804 (N.D. Ohio 2010); Parker v. Time Warner Entm’t Co., L.P.,
631 F. Supp. 2d 242, 279 (E.D.N.Y. 2009); Park v. Thomson Corp., 633 F. Supp. 2d 8,
13 (S.D.N.Y. 2009); Perez v. Asurion Corp., No. 06-20734-CIV, 2007 WL 2591174, at
*1 (S.D. Fla. July 31, 2007) (rejecting demand for 3.5 multiplier for “risk and lost
opportunity”); In re Holocaust Victim Assets Litig, 311 F. Supp. 2d 363, 381–82
(E.D.N.Y. 2004) (rejecting risk argument), aff’d, 424 F.3d 150 (2d Cir. 2005); In re
Elan Sec. Litig., 385 F. Supp. 2d 363, 377 (S.D.N.Y. 2005); In re Homestore.com, Inc.
Sec. Litig., No. CV01-11115 RSWL(CWX), 2004 WL 2792185, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Aug.
10, 2004); In re Indep. Energy Holdings PLC Sec. Litig., No. 00 Civ.6689 SAS, 2003
WL 22801724, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 24, 2003) (rejecting multiplier requests).
167
See, e.g., In re Holocaust Victim Assets Litig., 424 F.3d at 157 (noting that
others had made similar points more effectively and timely); Reynolds v. Beneficial
Nat’l Bank, 288 F.3d 277, 289 (7th Cir. 2002) (finding that “objectors added nothing”
since the subject of their objection was already presented to the court); Parker, 631
F. Supp. 2d at 279 (awarding no fee for objectors whose submission came after, but
“added nothing to, the substance of . . . a more effective objection” by others); UFCW
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already had in mind.168 Merely “laudable” involvement, without
“substantially enhanc[ing] the value of the settlement or
benefit[ing] the class sufficiently [does not] warrant [the] award
of attorneys’ fees.”169 Objector counsel “should not be rewarded
simply because they joined the battle on the side that
prevailed.”170
A potential exception to the general rule that objectors
should not receive fees may be institutional objectors. Several
courts have found that the input of institutional objectors had
value.171 Congress directed that state attorneys general be
notified of settlements and given the chance to opine on them.172

Local 880, 2008 WL 4452332, at *4 (awarding no payment to serial objector who
raised same objections that another objector did, in general form only, without
meaningful analysis); Azizian v. Federated Dep’t Stores, Inc., No. C-03-3359 SBA,
2006 WL 4037549, at *3, *9 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 29, 2006) (“[Objectors’] role was one of
confirmation [of matters raised by others] not origination.”); In re Prudential Ins. Co.
of Am. Sales Practices Litig., 962 F. Supp. 572, 593 n.50 (D.N.J. 1997) (stating
objectors’ arguments were not novel and had been raised by state attorneys general),
aff’d, 148 F.3d 283 (3d Cir. 1998).
168
See, e.g., UFCW Local 880, 2008 WL 4452332, at *6 (awarding nominal
payment for objector’s procedure suggestion because the court would have required
the procedure on its own); Perez, 2007 WL 2591174, at *1 (awarding no fee for
“suggestions” that court already incorporated into its oversight plan for the
settlement).
169
Azizian v. Federated Dep’t Stores, Inc., No. C-03-3359 SBA, 2007 WL 425850,
at *1 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 8, 2006).
170
UFCW Local 880, 2008 WL 4452332, at *3.
171
In re Holocaust Victim Assets Litig., 311 F. Supp. 2d at 370–71 (E.D.N.Y.
2004), aff’d, 424 F.3d 150 (2d Cir. 2005) (finding that individual objector’s input was
“belated” and “of no consequence” but that state Commissioner of Insurance’s timely
submission on same subject had been helpful); In re Cardinal Health, Inc. Sec. Litig.,
550 F. Supp. 2d 751, 753 (S.D. Ohio 2008) (finding that individual objectors did
“virtually nothing” but that institutional objectors had “play[ed] an important role in
delineating the reasonableness of the fee award”). In In re Horizon/CMS Healthcare
Corp. Securities Litigation, the court reduced class counsel’s fees by three percent
and awarded that entire amount to counsel for objector state pension funds, who had
“provided a useful, historical and comparative backdrop” for the court’s benefit. 3 F.
Supp. 2d 1208, 1215 (D.N.M. 1998). The court emphasized the importance of input
from institutional investors. Id. The fee award may have been an attempt to
encourage institutional investors to take a more active role in securities class action
litigation, as contemplated by the PSLRA. See id. at 1212 n.5 (noting that, though
Congress had hoped to encourage involvement of institutional investors, objector
institutions had declined to seek lead plaintiff position in this litigation).
172
28 U.S.C. § 1715(a)–(b), (d) (2006). For an earlier argument that the “state is
another potentially useful monitor of class action abuse,” see Brunet, supra note 7,
at 410–11. Professor Brunet rightly observes, however, that such participants are
“atypical” and that the prototypical objector is a class member represented by an
“entrepreneurial” private attorney. Id. at 425.
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In at least one recent case, a court found that such input from
state attorneys general was persuasive in the court’s decision to
disapprove a proposed settlement.173
Analogously, just as
Congress intended for institutional investors to be favored in the
context of appointment as lead plaintiffs in securities fraud
cases,174 institutions may have a better claim to a counsel fee for
a successful objection than do other objectors. Institutions are
less likely to become repeat objectors or to use the objection
process as a means to make money for themselves or their
counsel. As a result, their objections may be more likely to be
soundly reasoned.175
Certain public interest organizations may qualify for
different treatment as well, even though they are sometimes
repeat objectors.176
Scholars have noted the legitimate
contributions of such objectors.177 Unlike professional objector
counsel, these public interest organizations are not motivated
primarily by fees, even though such organizations are sometimes
awarded fees where their efforts substantially benefit the class.178
Finally, even if objectors are to be awarded fees, they should
be able to claim them only when they submit detailed,
contemporaneous time records supporting the time they claim.179
173
Figueroa v. Sharper Image Corp., 517 F. Supp. 2d 1292, 1328 (S.D. Fla.
2007). Attorney general objections are not always valid, however. In at least two
recent cases, courts rejected objections by attorneys general. Dewey v. Volkswagen,
No. 07-2240, 2010 WL 3018305, at *20–21 (D.N.J. July 30, 2010); Radosti v.
Envision EMI, LLC, No. 09-887, 2010 WL 2292343, at *22 (D.D.C. June 8, 2010).
174
See supra notes 126–29 and accompanying text.
175
See supra notes 105, 170 and accompanying text.
176
Such organizations would not include those who are ideologically opposed to
class actions or to the attorneys who bring them. The ulterior motive of such
organizations disqualifies them from claiming that they are acting in the interest of
class members rather than in their own selfish, even if nonmonetary, interests.
177
See, e.g., Brunet, supra note 7, at 456–63.
178
See id. at 437 n.150 (defining “professional objectors” so as to exclude those
“attorneys who sometimes are repeat players in the class action business who work
for state attorneys general or public interest groups . . . [because they] are unlikely
to be extortionists and particularly unlikely to withdraw an objection in exchange for
a privately negotiated fee”). For cases awarding fees to objecting public interest
organizations, see, for example, Bowling v. Pfizer, Inc., 102 F.3d 777, 779 (6th Cir.
1996); Duhaime v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 2 F. Supp. 2d 175, 176 (D. Mass.
1998); In re Domestic Air Transp. Antitrust Litig., 148 F.R.D. 297, 359–60 (N.D. Ga.
1993).
179
Often, objector counsel submit only opaque summaries that do not permit
meaningful review of their efforts. See, e.g., Mirfasihi v. Fleet Mortgage Corp., 551
F.3d 682, 687 (7th Cir.) (noting that objectors’ “fee applications . . . were barren of
the detail required”), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 2767 (2008); Park v. Thomson Corp.,
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Though class counsel normally are not required to submit their
own time records in cases in which their fee award is based on
the percentage of the fund method,180 a key reason for that is the
volume of information the court would have to review, given the
length and breadth of class action matters. In contrast, objector
counsel surface very late in the process and have relatively little
time invested in their objections.181 The court and class counsel,
whose fee would be shared with objector counsel, would have no
difficulty reviewing and analyzing such a limited amount of
information.
Again, to avoid deterring class counsel from taking on
inherently risky class action litigation, courts should avoid
reducing class counsel’s hard-earned fees by requiring that part
of those payments be given to objector counsel.182 Requiring
submission of time records would prevent extortionate fee
applications by objector counsel.183
CONCLUSION
The vast majority of class action settlements are fair and
reasonable results for the class. The vast majority of the cases in
which courts rejected settlements as unfair did so because those
courts exercised their fiduciary duty to the class and carefully
reviewed the proposed settlement, not because an objector
enlightened the courts about something that the judges had not
perceived. Objectors and those who advocate for them have
“vastly overstated the significance of the role they played” in
those cases.184

633 F. Supp. 2d 8, 13 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (objector offered “no billing records or
statement of time expended”); In re Indep. Energy Holdings PLC Sec. Litig., 2003
WL 22801724, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 24, 2003).
180
See, e.g., In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. Sales Practices Litig., 148 F.3d 283,
342 (3d Cir. 1998).
181
See, e.g., Lonardo v. Travelers Indem. Co., 706 F. Supp. 2d 766, 785–86 (N.D.
Ohio 2010); Park, 633 F. Supp. 2d at 13 (“[Professional objector J.P.] did not appear
in this action until three years [after the complaint was filed] and the time that he
devoted to this matter spanned a far shorter interval [than that of class counsel].”).
182
See supra notes 98–100 and accompanying text (stating that generous fees
are needed to give counsel incentive to bring risky, public interest-oriented cases).
183
The concern that objector counsel will demand an excessive fee is not an
academic one. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
184
Azizian v. Federated Dep’t Stores, Inc., No. C-03-3359 SBA, 2006 WL
4037549, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 29, 2006); see also Parker v. Time Warner Entm’t
Co., L.P., 631 F. Supp. 2d 242, 278 (E.D.N.Y. 2009) (noting the “immodesty” of
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Courts have “a duty to the silent majority as well as the
vocal minority.”185 That duty calls on courts to discourage
objections that are made primarily to delay the delivery of
settlement benefits to that “silent majority.”
Preventing
objectors, particularly professional objector counsel, from
extorting benefits for sitting by while class counsel worked hard,
at great risk, to create the settlement benefits for the class is an
additional benefit of restricting objections. By refusing requests
for objector counsel fees except when objectors present issues
that the court would not otherwise already perceive and which
substantially benefit class members, courts will reduce or even
remove the scourge of extortionate and dilatory objections from
the class action system, which would be a highly positive result
for class members.

objector counsel fee petition and stating that effect of that objection was “audacious”
and “exaggerated to say the least”).
185
In re Wireless Tel. Fed. Cost Recovery Fees Litig., 396 F.3d 922, 933 (8th Cir.
2005).

